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INTRODUCTION
2011 witnessed a number of blockbuster developments
in the world of class action litigation. The Supreme Court’s
opinion in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes1—the largest civil
rights class action suit in United States history—has the
potential to drastically reshape the fundamentals of the
class certification analysis.2 In the course of rejecting a
district court determination that plaintiffs’ challenges to a
national retailer’s uniform personnel policies exhibited
1. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
2. See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class
Actions: Wal-Mart v. Dukes and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 7 DUKE J.
CONST . L. & P UB. P OL ’Y 73, 77-85 (2011) (discussing how Dukes effectively
imposed a heightened standard of proof at the class certification stage and the
impact this holding will have on future proposed classes); Judith Resnik,
Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart
v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 148-50 (2011) (same);
Daniel Fisher, Wal-Mart Case Wounds but Doesn’t Kill the Class Action, FORBES
(June 21, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2011/06/21/wal-martcase-wounds-but-doesnt-kill-the-class-action/ (same).
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sufficient commonality for class treatment, the Court
subjected the proposed class to an increased level of
scrutiny and appears to have raised the bar for all future
groups seeking class certification.3 The Court also decided
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,4 issuing an opinion that
states that arbitration clauses in consumer contracts will be
enforced, even if they force parties to forfeit their ability to
seek any form of class-based relief.5 The societal impacts
that these precedents will have cannot be understated: not
only will they change the landscape of aggregate litigation
by altering the procedural avenues by which individuals are
able to seek vindication of their rights, but they will modify
the behaviors of employers, producers of consumer goods,
and other business entities.6 The lives of millions of
individuals—the vast majority of whom were not parties in
these suits and whose interests were not represented—will
be affected by these decisions.7
The Justices at One First Street, however, were not
responsible for 2011’s class action decision with the largest
potential ramifications for society. That distinction belongs
to United States Court of Appeals Judge Denny Chin of the
Second Circuit, who, when sitting by designation in the
Southern District of New York, rejected the proposed
settlement in the Google Books case.8 Even though Judge
3. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 79-80. The district court’s
decision was Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004),
aff’d in part, remanded in part, 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct.
2541 (2011).
4. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
5. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 85-96; Resnik, supra note 2, at
121-30; Editorial, Gutting Class Action, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2011, at A26; Brian
Fitzpatrick, Key Case Could End Class-Action Suits, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 7, 2010,
at E8.
6. See Resnik, supra note 2, at 91-93.
7. For instance, if future courts apply the holding in Concepcion liberally, it
is probable that all consumer contracts will force individuals to waive their
rights to seek class-based relief, which, in many cases, will prevent consumers
from having a viable means for pursuing claims. Further, as discussed infra
Part II, consumers and employees will be less likely to receive fair treatment
from corporations whose bad behaviors had been kept in check by the threat of
class-based liability. See Resnick, supra note 2, at 91-93.
8. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 669-70 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
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Chin’s decision did not resolve the core issues of the suit or
change the status quo, it was significant because of the
colossal public impacts that would have resulted from
adoption of the settlement.9 Had it been approved, the
Google Books settlement would have absolved Google of
liability for engaging in the wholesale copying and online
posting of copyrighted works without permission and
created a royalty scheme that would have granted Google
the right to continue doing so into perpetuity.10 Adoption of
the settlement would have revolutionized copyright law,
drastically expanding the public’s ability to access out-ofprint written works and significantly altering the copyright
rights of all current and future creators of original works.11
Despite the important issues that were at stake, the public’s
interests in the resolution of the suit lacked any type of
direct representation.
These decisions provide concrete examples of how
aggregate litigation can reshape society, with the verdicts
and (more commonly) settlements reached in these suits
having impacts that reach far beyond the original dispute
and into the lives of the public. The fact that class action
litigation can affect such changes should not be mistaken
for an unintentional byproduct, as it is clear that the parties
involved in drafting and enacting the procedural rules
authorizing such suits were aware that they would have
these types of consequences.12 Further, attempting to
characterize the oversized impacts of these suits as
9. See Giancarlo F. Frosio, Google Books Rejected: Taking the Orphans to the
Digital Public Library of Alexandria, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 81, 81 (2011) (“Digitization projects, such as the Google books project, are
reviving the hope that [the dream of a universal depository of knowledge] may
come true.”); Alessandra Glorioso, Note, Google Books: An Orphan Works Solution?, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 971, 971-74 (2010) (discussing how the proposed settlement would have given Google a constructive monopoly on copyrighted materials with unknown rightsholders (“orphan works”)).
10. See Glorioso, supra note 9, at 974; Amir Efrati & Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg,
Judge Rejects Google Books Settlement, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2011, at B1.
11. Frosio, supra note 9, at 81; Peter B. Maggs, The Balance of Copyright in
the United States of America, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 369, 374 (2010); Pamela
Samuelson, Google Book Search and the Future of Books in Cyberspace, 94
MINN. L. REV. 1308, 1310 (2010).
12. Indeed, there are indications that one of the primary motivations for
revising the class action rule in 1965 was consideration of the societal benefits
that could be reaped from such suits’ large impacts. See infra Part I.C.2.
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inherently good or bad for society makes little sense—
whether the resolution of a class-based suit has a beneficial
or detrimental impact will depend on the particulars of the
case and the way in which the claims are resolved. What is
not beyond critique, however, is questioning whether the
status quo is structured in a way that ensures that classbased suits are adjudicated in a way that furthers society’s
broader interests.
This Article expands upon existing critiques of
aggregate litigation by introducing the idea that many of
the common criticisms levied on the class action device can
be linked to the judicial system’s failure to recognize the
public’s heightened interests in the adjudication of classbased suits. That our system is not designed to take these
impacts into consideration is not only peculiar, but also a
major structural problem given the colossal repercussions
that class action suits can have for the general public.
Identification of this shortcoming suggests fertile grounds
for reform.
The reform developed in this Article—the Public
Advocate proposal—breaks new ground by introducing a
new actor to class action suits, changing the fundamental
dynamics of representative litigation and capturing
numerous benefits. This new litigant—the Public
Advocate—would represent the public’s interest in class
action litigation, ensuring that class-based suits are
adjudicated in an expedient, just manner and that they are
resolved in ways that respect the public’s interests. By
giving a voice to a group that has been marginalized by the
status quo, this reform would fix a fundamental flaw in our
representative litigation system and remedy many of the
problems associated with aggregate suits.
After reviewing the history of the procedural rules
authorizing representative litigation in Part I, Part II of
this Article reviews the literature discussing the problems
with modern class action practice, focusing on how
representative litigation has detrimentally affected not only
the judicial system and litigants, but also the public as a
whole. The dire state of class action litigation is primarily
attributed to courts inappropriately denying class
certification to certain groups of litigants, the interests of
class members and the public being inadequately
represented, and the prevalence of frivolous suits. Part III
introduces the Public Advocate proposal and argues that the
best way to address the status quo’s deficiencies is to add
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third-party public litigants—Public Advocates—to federal
class actions. Specific details concerning the reform are
supplied, including a description of the role that Public
Advocates would play in class action suits (and how this role
resembles the roles occupied by attorneys in other areas of
law), institutional details about how Public Advocates
would be organized and where they could be situated within
the federal government, and reasons why this reform would
help resolve the current system’s problems.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF REPRESENTATIVE LITIGATION
Before delving into the realities of modern class action
practice and the potential benefits that could be garnered
through reform, a brief review of group-based litigation’s
past is warranted. Over the last millennium, the procedural
rules allowing individuals to represent much larger groups
in civil suits have gone through a stop-and-start
evolutionary process. From the judiciary’s first uses of
representative classes to resolve competing property claims
in twelfth-century England to the explosion of securities
and product liability suits in the end of the twentieth
century, representative litigation’s developmental history
reveals several themes. The most prominent of these is the
growth of the device’s availability to litigants over time.
Analysis of this gradual expansion reveals policymakers’
beliefs that significant public goods would be captured by
increased use of aggregate litigation.13 Identification of the
benefits that were meant to flow from increased use of class
13. In order to avoid dedicating a disproportionate amount of space to this
topic, this Part discusses only the most pivotal moments in the evolution of
representative litigation. The most recent modifications to class action
litigation—the creation of subsection (f), the revision of subsection (c), the
enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act and the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act—will not be discussed as they did not modify core aspects of Rule
23. For academic discussions concerning these amendments, see Alan B.
Morrison, Improving the Class Action Settlement Process: Little Things Mean a
Lot, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 428 (2011) (discussing how class action procedures
have changed since the 1970s and arguing that these changes have improved
the settlement process); Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of
2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439 (2008);
John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23—What Were We Thinking?,
24 MISS. C. L. REV. 323, 340-60 (2005); George F. Sanderson III, Note,
Congressional Involvement in Class Action Reform: A Survey of Legislative
Proposals Past and Present, 2 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 315, 327-34 (1999).
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action litigation sets the stage for Part II’s discussion of the
problems with contemporary class action practice.
A. English and Early American Representative Litigation
As far as legal historians can tell, the first use of
representative litigation occurred in an English court of
equity in 1199.14 It wasn’t until the seventeenth century,
however, that England’s courts began to apply consistent
standards to suits that sought relief on behalf of (or against)
a class of individuals.15 During this period, courts looked to
a three-part test articulated by the Court of Chancery,
permitting representative actions when: (1) the number of
parties involved in the suit was large enough that filing
individual suits would be impracticable, (2) all the members
of the proposed class had a joint interest in the resolution of
the suit, and (3) the named parties adequately represented
the interests of the class.16
The rules governing representative litigation changed
very little in the period following the creation of the Court of
Chancery’s test17 and by the middle of the nineteenth
14. STEPHEN YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN
CLASS ACTION 38-39, 47-48 (1987) [hereinafter YEAZELL, MEDIEVAL GROUP
LITIGATION] (citing Martin, Rector of Barkway c. Parishioners of Nuthamstead
(1199) (Ch.), reprinted in Select Cases from the Ecclesiastical Courts of the
Province of Canterbury, c. 1200-1301, 95 SELDEN SOCIETY 8 (Norma Adams &
Charles Donahue, Jr. eds., 1981)). Given that modern class action practice
predominantly involves plaintiff classes suing individual defendants, it is
interesting that the earliest reported use of representative litigation saw an
individual plaintiff suing a class of defendants. For a discussion of how the
primary use of representative suits has gradually shifted from suits involving
defendant classes to its current state, see Stephen C. Yeazell, The Past and
Future of Defendant Classes in Collective Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 687 (1997)
[hereinafter Yeazell, Past and Future].
15. YEAZELL, MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION, supra note 14, at 69-71; Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1297, 1303-09
(1932).
16. Chafee, supra note 15, at 1308-09.
17. YEAZELL, MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION, supra note 14, at 100-01; Yeazell,
Past and Future, supra note 14, at 694. Interestingly, the use of representative
parties in England decreased from this point of time forward, and this type of
litigation neared extinction in the latter half of the nineteenth century. See
YEAZELL, MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION, supra note 14, at 197-212 (analyzing this
trend in litigation and discussing possible reasons for its occurrence).
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century, the fledgling American court system had imported
the English test.18 While the language that courts used to
describe the prerequisites for class suits changed over time,
the requirements remained the same.19 Hence, the evolution
of representative litigation remained relatively stagnant
from the time the Court of Chancery developed its threepart standard in the seventeenth century to the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.20
B. The 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The next major development in the history of
representative litigation occurred when Congress adopted
Rule 23 of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In
drafting and enacting Rule 23, the Advisory Committee on
the Civil Rules, the Supreme Court of the United States,
and Congress sought to expand the use of the class
construct, believing that allowing more parties to aggregate
their claims would accrue efficiency and equity gains that
would benefit society.21 While the class recognition rules set
18. The English procedural approach was introduced to America’s federal
jurisprudence via Federal Equity Rule No. 48. See Rabiej, supra note 13, at 324
& n.8; see also Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 302-03 (1853).
Similar provisions could be found in various states’ procedural rules. Chafee,
supra note 15, at 1300-01 & n.7. In accordance with these rules, courts of equity
could enter a single “bill of peace” that would resolve class-based claims. Id. at
1309-10; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Comment, A Distant Mirror: The Bill of Peace in
Early American Mass Torts and Its Implications for Modern Class Actions, 39
ARIZ. L. REV. 711, 713 (1997).
19. See sources cited supra note 15.
20. See H.R. DOC. NO. 75-588, at 22-23 (1938) (Advisory Committee’s notes to
Rule 23(a) of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) (discussing Equity Rule
No. 38 (Class Representation), which was a revised version of Equity Rule No.
48); DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 11 (2000); Arthur R. Miller, Comment, Of Frankenstein
Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem,”
92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 669 n.24 (1979) (“Federal Equity Rule No. 38 (1912)
provided: ‘When the question is one of common or general interest to many
persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring
them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole.’”
(quoting JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, FEDERAL EQUITY RULES (8th ed. 1933))).
21. 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CIVIL § 1752 (3d ed. 2005); see also Mary J. Davis, Toward the Proper Role for
Mass Tort Actions, 77 OR. L. REV. 157, 169 (1998) (“The class action procedure
thus evolved as a product of concern for the ‘convenient and economical’
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forth in the 1938 version of the Federal Rules ended up
being replaced less than thirty years after their adoption,
they served as an important stepping-stone in the
developmental odyssey of class-based litigation.
The 1938 version of Rule 23 authorized federal courts to
recognize three different types of representative classes.22
Although the original rule did not provide names for each
type of class, practitioners quickly labeled them true,
hybrid, and spurious classes. True classes involved groups
asserting rights that were “joint, or common, or secondary
in the sense that the owner of a primary right refuses to
enforce that right and a member of the class thereby
becomes entitled to enforce it.”23 This category included, for
example, a group of individuals with joint interests in a
trademark filing suit to enjoin a third party’s infringing use
of that mark.24 Hybrid classes existed in suits involving
groups of individuals, each of whom had a several right in
the same property, where “the object of the action is the
adjudication of claims which do or may affect specific
property involved in the action.”25 These classes can be
thought of as those present in basic “limited fund” cases,
where numerous creditors seek repayment from an
insolvent borrower and courts must determine which
creditors will receive less than the face value of their
claim.26 Finally, spurious classes consisted of groups of
individuals seeking to assert rights that were several with
there being “a common question of law or fact affecting the
provision of justice, coupled with the substantive concern of affording a
meaningful remedy to large numbers of otherwise disenfranchised victims of
breached obligations.” (footnotes omitted)).
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1938).
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (1938).
24. E.g., Grand Rapids Furniture Co. v. Grand Rapids Furniture Co., 127
F.2d 245, 251-52 (7th Cir. 1942); Matlaw Corp. v. War Damage Corp., 7 F.R.D.
349, 351-52 (S.D. Ind.), aff’d, 164 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1947).
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (1938).
26. E.g., Pa. Co. for Ins. on Lives & Granting Annuities v. Deckert, 123 F.2d
979, 982-83 (3d Cir. 1941); see also H.R. DOC. NO. 75-588, at 24 (1938) (Advisory
Committee’s notes to Rule 23(a)(2) of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure)
(noting that adjudications involving hybrid classes bore a strong resemblance to
modern bankruptcy proceedings); RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN,
COMPLEX LITIGATION 219 (4th ed. 2004) (“The prototype of the hybrid class
action was the equity receivership.”).
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several rights and a common relief . . . sought.”27 An
example of a spurious class would be a group of individuals
who purchased debentures from a company which had made
false statements in its prospectus and filed suit under the
applicable securities law.28 Courts distinguished between
judgments entered in suits involving the three different
types of classes; while verdicts entered in cases involving
true and hybrid classes were considered binding on all class
members, verdicts entered in cases involving spurious
classes were not given any preclusive effect.29
Comparing the 1938 version of Rule 23 with the English
rule that it replaced illuminates the goals and concerns that
animated the reform. Rule 23 expanded the range of
situations in which representative litigation could occur:
whereas the equitable rules allowed class representation
only when members of the class had a joint interest, Rule 23
authorized courts to recognize classes for groups with either
joint or several interests.30 While this expansion was
partially constrained by the fact that courts refused to
consider judgments entered for (or against) spurious classes
as binding on absent class members, the adoption of Rule 23
signaled an interest in increasing the ability of courts to
adjudicate large numbers of claims simultaneously.31
This reform was likely motivated by a belief that
greater use of this procedural device would benefit society
by helping the court system produce more efficient,
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3) (1938).
28. E.g., Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 704-05 (S.D.N.Y.
1961); Kaeppler v. James H. Matthews & Co., 180 F. Supp. 691, 695 (E.D. Pa.
1960).
29. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 20, at 11-12. The non-preclusive nature of
spurious class suits led some to view the spurious class as simply another
procedural mechanism by which the permissive joinder of parties could be
achieved, rather than a true form of representative litigation. David Marcus,
Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implication for the Modern
Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 673-74 (2011) (“[T]he spurious class action
promised little beyond that which permissive joinder under Rule 20 could
accomplish.”).
30. Compare Rabiej, supra note 13, at 324 (discussing Fed. Equity R. No. 48),
and HENSLER ET AL., supra note 20, at 10-11 (discussing Fed. Equity R. No. 38),
with FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1938).
31. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 20, at 11-12.
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consistent, and just results.32 The use of representative
litigation for groups of individuals with joint interests—
Rule 23’s true classes—appears to have been designed to
advance these interests. By empowering one individual to
take action on behalf of all similarly situated individuals,
the use of true classes would prevent duplicative suits from
being filed and eliminate the risk that multiple courts
would hear an issue and enter inconsistent judgments. The
use of representative litigation for groups of individuals
with several interests in certain property—Rule 23’s hybrid
classes—was set up to realize similar benefits. By allowing
all claimants to form a single hybrid class, the rule would
prevent each individual from having to file her own suit,
which not only helped claimants and reduced the burdens
placed on the courts, but also helped to circumvent the
problems associated with different courts entering
inconsistent rulings regarding parties’ property interests.
Finally, while the creation of the spurious class did not have
these beneficial effects, it signified an initial, albeit
hesitant, desire to provide courts with a powerful
aggregation tool—one that would allow them to efficiently
adjudicate suits that involved a large number of individuals
with claims that involved common issues of fact and law.
Despite the best intentions of those who drafted and
enacted the initial version of Rule 23, the reform was a
failure.33 Practitioners, judges, and commentators struggled
when deciding whether claims fell within the rule’s three
categories.34 Further, there was widespread uncertainty
among these groups regarding several key doctrinal points,
such as the extent to which class members were bound by
judgments and how jurisdictional requirements applied to
class-based claims.35 Because of these problems, the
enactment of the 1938 version of Rule 23 did not generate
the societal benefits that its creators had hoped for.
32. See John C. Harkins, Jr., Federal Rule 23—The Early Years, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 705, 709-10 (1997).
33. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 200 (1950) (noting
“enormous complications” resulting from the new class actions); WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 21, § 1752; Resnik, supra note 2, at 141.
34. CHAFEE, supra note 33, at 257-58; Rabiej, supra note 13, at 331.
35. H.R. DOC. NO. 89-391, at 38-45 (1966) (Advisory Committee’s notes to the
1966 amendment of Rule 23); Rabiej, supra note 13, at 331.
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C. The 1966 Revision to Rule 23
The legal community’s dissatisfaction with the state of
class-based litigation led to a massive overhaul of Rule 23 in
1966, just three decades after the original version of the
Rule had been enacted.36 As shall be discussed below and in
Part II, the revised rule has succeeded in expanding the use
of the class action device.37 The new version of the Rule,
however, has only achieved mixed results in advancing the
equitable and efficiency-based interests that motivated the
Rule’s original enactors to seek an increase in
representative litigation in the first place. As described by
one of the individuals involved in drafting the revised Rule:
The entire reconstruction of the Rule bespoke an intention to
promote more vigorously than before the dual missions of the
class-action device: (1) to reduce units of litigation by bringing
under one umbrella what might otherwise be many separate but
duplicating actions; (2) even at the expense of increasing
litigation, to provide means of vindicating the rights of groups of
people who individually would be without effective strength to
38
bring their opponents into court at all.

That these goals motivated the groups responsible for the
revision of Rule 23—the Advisory Committee on the Civil
Rules, Supreme Court, and Congress (collectively, “the
revisionists”)—is evident in the way they modified the class

36. Judith Resnik, From ‘Cases’ To ‘Litigation,’ 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1991, at 5, 8-9 (stating that one of the primary motivations behind
reforming Rule 23 was to do away with the confusing class categories set forth
in the former Rule). For a basic, but thorough, overview of Rule 23, see JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 659-734 (9th ed. 2005); see also John
Bronsteen & Owen M. Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419
(2003). For a review of the amendments to class action procedure since 1966, see
sources cited supra note 2.
37. See, e.g., Bruce Bertelsen et al., Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An
Empirical Study, 62 GEO. L.J. 1123, 1129 (1974) (analyzing case filings and
finding that the new rule did lead to an increase in class action suits). But see
Miller, supra note 20, at 670-76 (attributing the dramatic increase in class
action suits following 1966 to factors other than the enactment of the revised
Rule).
38. Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497,
497 (1969).
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certification requirements and in the way they expanded
the binding effect of judgments on class members.39
Subsections (a) and (b) of the 1966 version of Rule 23
radically redefined the types of litigants that could qualify
for class treatment.40 By abandoning the earlier rule’s
insistence that class members share joint interests or
specific types of several interests, the first two subsections
of the new rule ensured that the class certification decision
would no longer be dictated by the results of a highly
technical analysis.41 Under the new paradigm, the
certification decision depended on a judicial determination
as to whether (1) the proposed class possessed the nontechnical, prerequisite group characteristics listed in
subsection (a) of the Rule, and (2) the proposed class’s suit
had qualities that matched one of the categories set forth in
subsection (b) of the Rule.42 The revisionists defined the
characteristics and categories listed in the revised Rule in a
broad manner that opened the class action door to litigants
who previously would have lacked access.43 By instituting
these changes, the revisionists expressed their desire to
expand the types of groups that could engage in class-based
litigation, as well as their increasing comfort with allowing
members of the judiciary to exercise a greater degree of
discretion when determining whether class certification was
appropriate.
While it is clear that the new Rule was meant to
increase the use of representative classes in civil suits,
determining why the revisionists expanded access in the
39. See Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation,
Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 48 (1975) (identifying
reduced transaction costs, individual compensation, and deterrence of wrongful
conduct as the chief policies advanced by the procedural expansion of class
action litigation).
40. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1938), with FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1966).
41. Rabiej, supra note 13, at 331-33.
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)-(b).
43. Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalism from the 1960s Class Action Rule
and the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1929, 1940 (2007)
(“As for the focus on the consumer, securities, and antitrust cases, the drafters
of Rule 23 assumed that groups of plaintiffs, assisted by lawyers attracted by
fees, would enable federal judges to enforce federal regulations aimed at
corporate misbehavior.”).
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specific ways they did is a tougher task.44 There are two
basic ways to determine the motivations behind the 1966
reform of Rule 23: (1) looking at the statements and records
of individuals involved with the drafting and enactment of
the revised Rule, and (2) analyzing the revised Rule itself
and attempting to decipher intent from its provisions. This
Article primarily utilizes the latter approach.45
1. Types of Certifiable Classes. The general claim that
the 1966 revision of Rule 23 sought to advance efficiency
and fairness interests by increasing access to the class
action device is uncontroversial to the point of being banal.46
Greater insight into the specific goals that the reform was
meant to accomplish can be gained by analyzing the
mechanisms by which the revised Rule extended and (even
more importantly) refused to extend access to aggregate
litigation.47 Subsection (b) of the Rule authorized class
certification for groups of individuals that could show:
● that non-class litigation could lead to courts issuing
judgments that make contradictory demands on a defendant
((b)(1)(A) classes) or that are dispositive of other party’s
interests ((b)(1)(B) classes);
● that the party opposing the potential class treated all
of the class members in generally the same manner and
that injunctive relief would resolve the class members’
problems ((b)(2) classes); or
● that there are so many questions of law or fact
common to the potential class members’ claims that use of

44. Kaplan, supra note 38, at 497.
45. Benjamin Kaplan, the official Reporter for the committee that drafted the
revised Rule, has discussed the motivations that led to the creation of the
modern Rule. Id.; Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee:
1966 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 375400 (1967); see also Dam, supra note 39, at 48.
46. JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 703-05 (6th ed. 1993) (noting that
the 1966 amendment expanded access to class actions); Robert G. Bone & Davis
S. Evans, Class Certification and Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 125960 (2002) (“The shift . . . opened up new possibilities for the class action and led
to greatly expanded use of the device.”); Rabiej, supra note 13, at 327-28.
47. Resnik, supra note 2, at 142 (“[I]ts subparts were . . . crafted with discrete
sets of plaintiffs in mind.”).
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representative litigation should be permitted ((b)(3)
classes).48
The revisionists’ decision to enumerate specific types of
groups eligible for class certification raises the question why
these categories, as opposed to others, were selected for
inclusion.49
Subsection (b)(1) classes are defined in such
functionalist language that the revisionists’ intention in
enacting this part of the Rule can be seen in the text of the
provision. Rule 23(b)(1) authorizes certification of classes
whenever doing so would either avoid the risk that multiple
separate “adjudications . . . would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class” or
avoid the problems posed by individual adjudications that
“would be dispositive of [or substantially impair] the
interests of” other potential class members.50 Given these
criteria, it is clear that the revisionists extended access to
these groups because they thought doing so was necessary
to advance equity interests that traditional litigation did
not address. More specifically, the revisionists viewed
representative litigation as a way to eliminate the problems
created when a judgment entered in one lawsuit forced a
party to take a certain action, the performance of which
would cause the party to violate the judgment entered
against them in a related but separate lawsuit.51 They also
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)-(3).
49. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 1753 (“[T]he Committee felt that the
original [1936] rule ‘did not squarely address itself to the question of the
measures that might be taken during the course of the action to assure
procedural fairness,’ [and that the amended rule] describes in more practical
terms the occasions for maintaining class actions.”); see also Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557-59 (2011).
50. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1).
51. H.R. DOC. NO. 89-391, at 37-45 (1966) (Advisory Committee’s notes to the
1966 Amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see also Corley v.
Entergy Corp., 222 F.R.D. 316, 320 (E.D. Tex. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Corley v.
Orangefield Indep. Sch. Dist., 152 F. App’x 350 (5th Cir. 2005); Van Gemert v.
Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Yeazell, Past and Future,
supra note 14, at 696. Courts have also had to combat this type of problem when
dealing with conflicts between federal and state laws. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat’l
Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Emp. Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 138-46
(1976).
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believed that representative litigation could be used to
prevent opportunistic, collusive, or ineptly represented
parties from being able to obtain judgments that would
unfairly preclude other individuals from asserting similar
claims.52
The revisionists’ decision to extend class action access to
the groups described in subsection (b)(2) was also motivated
by equitable concerns.53 Analysis of the types of suits
authorized under this subsection, however, reveals the
problems it was designed to address.54 By offering class
certification to any group of individuals seeking injunctive
relief against a party who “acted or refused to act on
grounds that apply generally” to the group, subsection (b)(2)
opened the courthouse doors to certain types of litigants—
those seeking to prospectively modify another party’s
behavior at more than an individualized level—who had
previously lacked an effective form of relief.55 Examples of
such groups would be individuals who claim that a
defendant’s policy or pattern of behavior infringes their civil
rights, violates employment discrimination laws, or ignores
environmental regulations.56 The expansion of class action
52. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 833 (1999) (“[The Advisory
Committee] spied out situations where lawsuits conducted with individual
members of the class would have the practical if not technical effect of
concluding the interests of the other members as well, or of impairing the ability
of the others to protect their own interests.” (quoting Kaplan, supra note 45, at
388)).
53. Memorandum from John P. Frank to the Civil Rules Comm., Response to
1996 Circulation of Proposed Rule 23 on Class Actions (Dec. 20, 1996), in
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2 WORKING PAPERS OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULE 23,
260, 266 (1997) (“[23(b)(2) classes were intended to] create a class action system
which could deal with civil rights and, explicitly, segregation.”).
54. Resnik, supra note 2, at 84, 142.
55. Id.
56. Edward F. Sherman, Introduction to the Symposium—Complex
Litigation: Plagued by Concerns Over Federalism, Jurisdiction, and Fairness, 37
AKRON L. REV. 589, 591 (2004) (“The paradigms [of Rule 23(b)(2) class actions
seeking declarative or injunctive relief] have been the ‘civil rights’ suits of the
1960s and 1970s that helped bring an end to segregation and enforced the civil
rights acts, and the ‘institutional reform’ suits of the 1970s and 1980s that
applied constitutional and statutory standards to governmental institutions like
prisons, mental hospitals, and welfare departments, and to companies charged
with unfair employment practices.” (footnotes omitted)); Jack Greenberg, Civil
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access to these litigants constituted an attempt to make our
procedural system more equitable by creating a means for
individuals to bring injunction-based reform litigation.57
Lastly, we turn to the goals the revisionists sought to
achieve by authorizing class certification for the groups
described in subsection (b)(3). The definition of (b)(3) classes
differs from those set forth in the earlier subsections in that
it directly indicates that efficiency concerns played a role in
the expansion of representative litigation.58 The language in
subsection (b)(3) is vague, essentially offering class
certification to any group of litigants who could show that
class treatment of their claims would be efficient. This lack
of specificity stands in marked contrast from the (b)(1) and
(b)(2) class definitions, which are concrete enough that they
seemed to be tailored to address specific deficiencies in the
status quo. Rather than limit the use of class certification to
suits involving parties that would be harmed if individual
litigation occurred or groups seeking uniform injunctive
relief, this provision authorizes certification for any group
that can show that “questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any question affecting only
individual members” and that use of a “class action [would
be] superior to other available methods . . . [of] adjudicating
the controversy.”59 The language of subsection (b)(3)
showcases not only the revisionists’ conviction that broader
use of representative suits could result in significant
efficiency gains in our courts, but also their belief that it
was necessary to subject “common issue” classes to a higher
Rights Class Actions: Procedural Means of Obtaining Substance, 39 ARIZ. L. REV.
575, 577 (1997) (“Indeed, those who revised the federal class action rules in 1966
took particularly into account the concerns of civil rights litigants. Professor
Albert Sacks, who was Associate Reporter of the revised rules, was intimately
familiar with civil rights litigation and had in mind the role of class actions in
civil rights litigation in formulating the rule. . . . The partnership between class
actions and civil rights has grown to such an extent that the Advisory
Committee revising Rule 23 noted that, ‘subdivision (b)(2) has cemented the role
of class actions in enforcing a wide array of civil rights claims.’”).
57. H.R. DOC. NO. 89-391, at 41 (1966) (Advisory Committee’s notes to the
1966 Amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
58. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558 (2011); Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 (1997).
59. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see also Yeazell, Past and Future, supra note 14,
at 697.
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level of scrutiny—in the form of the predominance and
superiority requirements—prior to certification.60
The revisionists’ inclusion of subsection (b)(3) also
advanced an important equitable interest. Prior to the
revised Rule’s enactment, the high costs of litigation meant
that many individuals who had low-value claims against
other parties were economically barred from pursuing these
claims, as the cost of suing would exceed any damages they
might be awarded.61 The creation of (b)(3) classes removed
this economic deterrent—by allowing large numbers of
individuals to aggregate their claims and pursue them in a
single action, it reduced per-litigant transaction costs to the
point where individuals would be able to benefit from small
damage awards.62
2. Prerequisite Class Characteristics. Analysis of the
23(b) class types has established that the 1966 revision of
Rule 23 was intended to expand access to class actions and
capture fairness and efficiency gains. If we understand the
broad class categories articulated in subsection (b) to be
part of the revisionists’ effort to increase access to class
certification, subsection (a)’s prerequisites should be viewed
as their attempt to create a quality control mechanism. The
revisionists recognized that even when a group of
individuals qualified for class treatment under subsection
(b), the facts underlying certain claims might make it
60. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2558; HENSLER
Resnik, supra note 2, at 143.

ET AL.,

supra note 20, at 14;

61. See Memorandum from the Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules to the
Chairman and Members of the Standing Comm. on Practice and Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the U.S., Summary Statement of the Civil Rules
Amendments Recommended for Adoption 7 (June 10, 1965) (“If separate
litigations are always required, then access to the courts may be put out of reach
for those whose individual stakes are low or who by reason of poverty or
ignorance will not go it alone.”); see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:
Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 9
(1991); Resnik, supra note 2, at 142-43.
62. See Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 616-17 (noting that 23(b)(3) class actions
allow for the aggregation of small recoveries which makes litigation
worthwhile); Kaplan, supra note 38, at 497 (stating that the modified Rule
would “provide means of vindicating the rights of groups of people who
individually would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into
court at all”).
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undesirable to certify those claims for class treatment.63
Subsection (a) addressed this concern by providing judges
with the ability to deny certification to proposed classes that
did not possess four prerequisite characteristics—
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy.64
Presumably, the drafters of the revised Rule included this
provision because they felt that representative litigation
involving groups that lacked one (or more) of these qualities
would be undesirable.65 This sentiment is reasonable, as it is
hard to understand how representative litigation would
benefit society if courts certified classes that could be
accommodated via joinder, classes possessing widely
divergent claims, classes where the class representative’s
claims do not match up with those of the class as a whole, or
classes whose members were inadequately represented.66
D. Summary
The evolution of representative litigation in the United
States, both in terms of its procedural underpinnings and
the goals it was meant to serve, stands out as one of the
most novel legal experiments in our country’s legal history.
It began as an esoteric and rarely used device that was only
recognized by courts of equity and which some
commentators felt served little purpose.67 Over time, the
legal community began to realize the potential efficiency
63. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (listing the prerequisites for a class action);
Rabiej, supra note 13, at 327-28 (arguing that a more efficient Rule 23 will
result in more litigation).
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
65. The drafters’ decision may also have been motivated by a desire to create
a discretionary mechanism that the courts could use to control the flow of class
action lawsuits. Legislative history indicates that the Advisory Committee was
concerned that making the class action procedure too efficient would cause a
“freeway effect”—wherein the courts would be besieged with an overwhelming
number of suits, most of which would not have been filed absent the reform.
Rabiej, supra note 13, at 327-28.
66. See Marissa L. Bracke, Where Improper Purposes Lead, Inadequate
Protections Follow: Integrating the Rule 11 Improper Purpose Inquiry with the
Rule 23 Protections for Absent Class Members, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 353, 353-55
(2006) (discussing the importance of each requirement and its importance in
pursuing the goals of representative litigation).
67. CHAFEE, supra note 33, at 200; Yeazell, Past and Future, supra note 14, at
694.
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and equity gains that were attainable through increased
aggregate litigation and took steps to increase the
availability of class action certification.68 This led to the
modern version of the Rule, which attempts to take
advantage of the benefits that are generated by liberal use
of representative litigation and minimize the burdens that
class-based suits can impose. The following Part of this
Article discusses the extent to which the Rule has been
effective in striking this balance and identifies the largest
problems with contemporary class action litigation.
II. PROBLEMS CAUSED BY CONTEMPORARY CLASS ACTION
PRACTICE
Having reviewed the history of representative litigation
and the different goals that drove the creation and evolution
of the class action, we are now in a position to critique the
state of modern representative litigation. One important
basis for evaluation is determining whether class action
suits are effectively capturing the benefits that the
revisionists had in mind when enacting Rule 23.
Additionally, we can look beyond the revisionists’ goals and
analyze the impact of these suits, not only on the litigants
themselves, but also on society as a whole. A review of class
action practice establishes that the contemporary
incarnation of representative litigation has largely failed to
provide the benefits the revisionists had envisioned and, in
fact, has had detrimental effects on the judicial system,
litigants, and the general public.
The majority of the discussion in this Part will center on
the problems that suits involving Rule 23(b)(3) classes have
generated. This focus is appropriate given that (b)(3) classes
have been at the heart of many of the largest (both in terms
of the numbers of individuals involved and the size of
settlements and verdicts), most drawn out, and most
controversial suits in recent decades.69 Whereas many
68. See, e.g., William H. Pryor Jr., Class Actions in the Gulf South
Symposium: A Comparison of Abuses and Reforms of Class Actions and
Multigovernment Lawsuits, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1885, 1887-88 (2000) (discussing the
recognition of equitable gains that could be accomplished through expansion of
representative litigation).
69. See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 517 F.3d 76, 82 (2d Cir.
2008); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 752 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Vioxx
Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 558 (E.D. La. 2009); Brown v. Am.
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critiques of our class action system have focused exclusively
on analyzing how the adjudication of these suits affect
litigants and the court system, this Article also pays special
attention to the ways in which modern practices harm the
public as a whole.70
As discussed earlier, the resolution of suits involving
representative parties often have significant impacts on
individuals that are not directly involved in the suit and
whose interests are not represented before the court.
Because class-based suits tend to have these oversized
impacts, they implicate the interests of non-parties—the
general public—in ways that standard litigation does not.
While Part II.A reviews the ways in which the status quo
harms litigants and the courts, Part II.B is dedicated to
discussing the ways in which modern class action practices
harm members of the public. These society-wide detriments
provide a crucial part of the justification for the Public
Advocate proposal.
A. Problems for Litigants and Courts
From the moment the modern version of Rule 23 was
enacted to the current day, scholars have debated the
shortfalls (and, less commonly, the merits) of our system of
representative litigation.71 Because of the breadth of this
Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Liability Litigation), Nos. 1203, 99-20593,
2000 WL 1222042, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug 28, 2000); Lindsey v. Dow Corning Corp.
(In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. CV 92-P-10000-S,
1994 WL 578353, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994).
70. See, e.g., Mark C. Weber, A Consent-Based Approach to Class Action
Settlement: Improving Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1155,
1193 (1998) (discussing the importance of consent of individual class members);
Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX.
L. REV. 571, 603-04 (1997) (highlighting the importance of the participation of
individuals in complex litigation).
71. See MARTHA DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, 1960-1973, at 56-70 (1993) (discussing civil rights class actions in
the south); MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 1-19 (2009) (criticizing modern
class actions); Kaplan, supra note 38, at 499-500 (expressing optimism for the
future of class actions); Arthur John Keefe et al., Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33
CORNELL L.Q. 327, 327 (1948) (“The existing confusion and uncertainty
surrounding the nature of the class action, and the failure of this procedural
device to accomplish the ends of which it is capable, suggest that a critical
inquiry into the present-day doctrines of the class suit might well be in order,
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literature, this Article’s treatment of the problems with
modern class litigation does not purport to be
comprehensive. Instead, this Part focuses on describing the
issues that have most strongly undermined representative
litigation’s ability to capture the efficiency and equity gains
envisioned by the revisionists. Five aspects of modern class
action practice bear primary responsibility for the
mechanism’s poor reputation: (1) inappropriate denials of
class certification, (2) inadequate representation of class
members’ interests, (3) failures to screen out meritless suits
at early stages, (4) use of inept mechanisms to distribute
damages and settlement awards, and (5) the heavy
administrative burden these cases place on courts.
1. Inappropriate Denials of Class Certification.
Increasing the availability of the class action device was one
of the main impetuses that led to the development of the
modern version of Rule 23. While the 1966 reform was not
instituted for the benefit of any one type of claimant, it is
clear that the revisionists wanted to provide access to classbased litigation to individuals who possessed small claims
that would be impractical to litigate in a non-group
capacity.72 Examples of these groups would be consumers
who purchased a particular commercial product that was
unfit for its ordinary purpose or whose label contained
inaccurate claims about the product73 and groups of
employees who have been discriminated against by their

and that attention might well be given to [their] drawbacks.”); Francis R.
Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation—Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70
F.R.D. 199, 205-07 (1976) (criticizing consumer class actions); Miller, supra note
20, at 666-67 (arguing that much of the criticism of class actions is based on
erroneous assumptions); William Simon, Class Actions—Useful Tools or Engine
of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 375-76 (1973) (highlighting problems of class
actions); Woolley, supra note 70, at 571-73 (arguing that individual class
members “may not be properly represented in class action suits”).
72. Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997); Macey &
Miller, supra note 61, at 8-9; Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of
Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1167-68 (2009).
73. See Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility to
Small-Claims Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 305-07 (2010)
(“[I]t should be fairly uncontroversial to observe that small claims consumer
cases are a—if not the—primary reason why class actions exist.”); see also
Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 59 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[I]t is often not
rational for individual consumers or attorneys to bring small claims.”).
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employer.74 Creating a procedural avenue that would allow
these types of groups to pursue their claims served dual
purposes—not only did it give individuals an effective
means by which they could vindicate violations of their
rights, it also helped deter illegal activity by increasing the
likelihood that wrongdoers would be held accountable for
their behaviors.75
While the revised Rule initially succeeded in providing
these groups with a way to efficiently pursue their claims,
recent shifts in class certification doctrines have resulted in
these groups once again being denied access to the
courthouse.76 Throughout the 1970s, ‘80s, and ‘90s courts
certified small-claims consumer class actions on a regular
basis.77 Class certification of these groups, however, has
decreased dramatically over the past decade.78 This shift is
due to an increasing number of judges refusing to certify a
class unless it can be demonstrated that the identity of the
members of the class is “ascertainable.”79 Judges have
linked
the
“ascertainablity”
requirement
to
the
manageability requirement set forth in 23(b)(3), claiming
that adjudicating a case involving a class of consumers that
74. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 20, at 16-17; see also Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558 (2011) (“We think it clear that
individualized monetary claims [in a class action suit asserting sex
discrimination claims against an employer] belong in Rule 23(b)(3).”); Abron v.
Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 654 F.2d 951, 973 (4th Cir. 1981) (stating that class
actions are necessary for employees to have a viable way to sue discriminatory
employers).
75. Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The Problem of Statutory
Damages and Class Actions, 74 MO. L. REV. 103, 109 (2009).
76. See generally Gilles, supra note 73 (discussing the growing hostility of
courts to small-claims consumer class actions).
77. Id. at 308; Alec Johnson, Vioxx and Consumer Product Pain Relief: The
Policy Implications of Limiting Courts’ Regulatory Influence over Mass
Consumer Product Claims, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1039, 1047 (2008) (discussing
the expansion of consumer class actions in the 1980s and 1990s).
78. Johnson, supra note 77, at 1066-69 (noting the increasingly heavy
restrictions courts have placed on class action suits).
79. See, e.g., Gray v. Bayer Corp., Civil Action No. 08-4716, 2011 WL
2975768, at *8 (D.N.J. July 21, 2011); McBean v. City of New York, 228 F.R.D.
487, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Van West v. Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 199 F.R.D.
448, 451 (D.R.I. 2001); Thompson v. Am. Tobacco Co., 189 F.R.D. 544, 556 (D.
Minn. 1999).
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has not been fully identified at the beginning of the suit
poses insurmountable problems when it comes to issues
such as providing notice to class members, proving actual
injury, and distributing damages that might be awarded.80
Even though the manageability worries expressed by
today’s courts appear to be legitimate judicial concerns, it is
questionable whether such concerns are strong enough to
justify foreclosing the only viable avenue consumers have
for filing certain types of suits.81 Decreasing the ability of
individuals to seek vindication of their rights through
representative litigation has caused the very harms that led
to the revision of Rule 23.82 Contracting access in this way
creates an environment where individuals are prevented
from asserting their rights whenever the potential recovery
from an individualized suit is less than the transactional
costs associated with such litigation, and corporations can
commit minor violations of consumer laws with impunity.83
Given the high costs of litigation, this means that a number
80. See cases cited supra note 79.
81. For instance, it is typically not the case that the judge’s options are
limited to dismissing the suit or certifying the class exactly as plaintiff’s counsel
proposes it. Judges have attempted to work around the “ascertainability”
problems in various ways—by working with the parties to develop a feasible
way to identify class members, utilizing a recovery mechanism that does not
depend on ex ante knowledge of class members’ identities, bifurcating a suit into
a class-wide liability proceeding and individualized damages proceedings, etc.
See, e.g., In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 294 (6th Cir. 1988) (affirming a
district court’s decision to trifurcate a multi-district litigation by trying two
liability issues jointly and, if necessary, remanding individual cases to their
originating districts for damages trials); Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1365
(1st Cir. 1972) (“[Denial for] vaguely-perceived management problems . . .
discount[s] too much the power of the court to deal with a class suit flexibly, in
response to difficulties as they arise.”); In re Bristol Bay, Alaska, Salmon
Fishery Antitrust Litig., 78 F.R.D. 622, 628 (W.D. Wash. 1978) (“[D]ismissals for
management reasons, in view of the public interest involved in class actions,
should be the exception rather than the rule.”).
82. Kaplan, supra note 38, at 497.
83. See, e.g., In re Am. Reserve Corp., 840 F.2d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 1988)
(discussing the role that class action suits have in deterring corporations from
engaging in unlawful conduct); Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 676 & n.43 (7th Cir.
1981) (same); Abron v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., 654 F.2d 951, 973 (4th Cir.
1981) (“Without the backing of a comprehensive class, individual plaintiffs or
their lawyers will find it difficult to muster the resources and incentives
sufficient to tackle industrial giants.”).
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of the rights and protections that lawmakers have afforded
individuals are essentially unenforceable.84
2. Inadequate Representation of Class Members’
Interests. One of the more challenging problems that the
revisionists had to tackle when revising Rule 23 was to find
a way in which the use of representative litigation could be
expanded
without
unduly
impairing
individuals’
constitutionally protected property interests in their claims.
They addressed concerns that individuals’ claims could be
unfairly extinguished by the resolution of a representative
suit they had little to no control over (or, often, knowledge
of) in several ways.85 First, the class certification process
was designed to ensure that groups would only be certified
as classes if they could show that class counsel would
adequately represent class members’ interests and that the
class members shared key common interests.86 Second, for
damages actions, the revised Rule required groups to show
that proceeding with the suit as a class action would be
superior to having each individual file a separate claim.87
Third, the Rule mandated that all class members in 23(b)(3)
classes be given an opportunity to opt out of the suit and
retain their ability to pursue their claims individually.88
Finally, the revisionists granted courts the ability to divide
classes into independently represented subclasses whenever
they felt there were problematic conflicts of interests
between class members.89
The sad reality is that, despite the revisionists’ best
attempts to head these problems off at the pass, it has
become commonplace for class counsel to ignore class
84. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 79-80 (discussing the impact of
Wal-Mart v. Dukes on class actions); Gilles, supra note 73, at 309 (“As some
district judges have candidly acknowledged, the rigorous application of the
ascertainability requirement will often entail impunity for corporate defendants
who perpetrate harms in relatively modest increments upon large numbers of
consumers.”).
85. Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions,
the Case-or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory
Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 599-605 (2006).
86. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
87. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
88. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v); Rabiej, supra note 13, at 344.
89. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5).
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members’ interests or to trade the interests of some class
members off against the interests of others.90 Supreme
Court precedent has established that representation can
only be considered adequate when class counsel recognizes
the relative economic value of different classes of claims and
acts in ways that protect the value of each class of claims. 91
Modern procedural rules dictate that whenever a suit
succeeds in procuring a recovery for class members,
decisions made by class counsel will end up playing a
significant role in determining how that award is allocated
among class members.92 While there are certain situations
where class counsel performing this role will not be
inherently problematic—determining award amounts where
the fund is large and class members have suffered identical
or easily quantifiable injuries, for instance—there are other
instances where it will. For example, it is questionable
whether it is even conceptually possible for class counsel to
adequately represent the interests of an entire class when,
upon settlement, the different subsets of the class seek to
maximize their recovery from a very limited fund. While
Rule 23 mandates that suits may not be settled unless the
presiding judge approves of the settlement after conducting
a fairness hearing, this safeguard has proven to be anything
but foolproof.93 Modern class action procedure does not
90. See Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58
U. KAN. L. REV. 979, 1008-10 (2010) (highlighting lawyer-client conflicts in the
all-or-nothing settlement model, such as lawyer compensation structure and
differing interests within the represented class); Macey & Miller, supra note 61,
at 45 (describing the improper incentive for plaintiffs’ lawyers to structure or
negotiate class settlements depending on the lawyers’ fee arrangement); Redish
& Kastanek, supra note 85, at 599-605 (criticizing Rule 23 for not adequately
protecting the interests of class members).
91. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626-28 (1997).
92. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Review of Class
Action Settlements, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 167, 188-90 (2009) (discussing factors
courts use to scrutinize allocation by class counsel).
93. See Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly,
J., dissenting) (discussing the inadequate nature of judicial scrutiny of proposed
settlements, stating that once the adversaries have agreed, “[a]ll the dynamics
conduce to judicial approval of [the] settlement[]”), aff’d en banc by equally
divided court, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. dismissed sub nom. Holt v.
Alleghany Corp., 384 U.S. 28 (1966); see also Bronsteen & Fiss, supra note 36, at
1448 (“When a court reviews a settlement, . . . it gives great deference to the
parties’ choices in the bargaining process and does not exercise its independent
judgment for the remedy.”); Macey & Miller, supra note 61, at 46-47 (identifying
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provide any mechanism that can reliably ensure that
settlements do not ignore, subordinate, or undervalue
certain class members’ claims.94
The settlement reached in the Agent Orange litigation
serves as a perfect example of a case in which these types of
adequacy of representation problems surfaced.95 In Agent
Orange, class counsel represented all veterans who had
been exposed to the Agent Orange chemical weapon while
serving in Vietnam and, as a result of this exposure, were
more likely to develop various types of cancer.96 The suit
resulted in a court-approved settlement under which the
manufacturers of the chemical compound created a large
fund that class members could file claims with.97 The
parties’ lawyers and the judge created a distribution plan
that categorized class members and dictated the amount of
compensation that members of each category were entitled
to receive.98 While the settlement purported to represent the
interests of the entire class, the plan provided that veterans
whose injuries manifested after 1994 would not receive any
form of monetary compensation.99 It is difficult to see how
various reasons why judges have been ineffective at screening out abusive
settlements); Andrew Rosenfield, An Empirical Test of Class-Action Settlement,
5 J. LEGAL STUD. 113, 119 figs. 1 & 2 (1976) (finding that settlements of class
action suits tend to result in monetary bonuses to attorneys at the expense of
class members’ interests).
94. Aside from the requirement that settlements be approved by the judge
presiding over the matter, the only solutions to these problems that are
commonly employed involve (1) the creation of subclasses for each group with
divergent interests and appointment of separate counsel to represent each
subclasses’s interests, or (2) employing third parties or mediators to assist
lawyers with deciding how the settlement should be distributed among different
groups of class members. Because use of either of these solutions tends to
impose significant costs on the settlement fund and is discretionary, neither can
be relied upon to adequately protect class members’ interests. See, e.g.,
Erichson, supra note 90, at 1011 (discussing the high cost of mediators and
other third parties).
95. See Patrick Woolley, Collateral Attack and the Role of Adequate
Representation in Class Suits for Money Damages, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 917, 93538 (2010) (arguing that the Agent Orange plaintiffs’ lawyers’ self-interest led
them to neglect the interests of segments of the class).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 935.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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the court could have considered class counsel’s
representation of the interests of future claim plaintiffs to
be adequate, given counsel’s failure to procure any form of
relief for this subclass of individuals.100 The fact that the
Agent Orange settlement was approved by the trial court
showcases how the status quo’s minimal procedural
safeguards can fail to protect individuals from the dangers
inherent in bundling claims together and adjudicating them
en masse.101
Modern procedure has also fostered adequacy of
representation problems by providing inadequate checks
against class counsel engaging in settlement-related
practices that place their own interests ahead of class
members.102 The misalignment in the interests of class
counsel and class members is both obvious and widelyrecognized—class counsel are interested in their
100. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626-27 (1997)
(decrying a proposed settlement that denied future claim plaintiffs any relief,
finding that “[t]he settling parties . . . achieved a global compromise with no
structural assurance of fair and adequate representation for the diverse groups
and individuals affected”).
101. The Second Circuit recognized that individuals who developed injuries
after 1994 had not been adequately represented by class counsel in the first
action and issued a decision allowing such individuals to collaterally attack the
preclusive effect of the settlement. Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249,
257-59, 261 (2d Cir. 2001), aff'd in relevant part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003). While
some might argue that the Second Circuit’s reversal indicates that the status
quo contains adequate protections for absent class members, such an argument
misses the mark. The fact that the appellate safety net has, at times, identified
and reversed abusive settlements that have been approved by district courts
does not establish that the class settlement procedures work well. Rather, it
merely indicates that a separate procedural system—the appellate review
process—is performing its function.
102. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class
and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 714-16 (1986) (“Although courts
have long recognized [the danger of collusive settlements] and have developed
some procedural safeguards intended to prevent [them], these reforms are far
from adequate to the task.”); Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians?
A New Approach for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 38-47
(2002) (describing the factors that have contributed to the prevalence of abusive
settlement practices); see also Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 126 F.3d 1235, 1250 (9th
Cir. 1997) (refusing to recognize the binding effect of a class action settlement
because class counsel did not adequately represent the class’s interests when
brokering the deal); sources cited supra notes 91-95.
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contingency fee, whereas class members are interested in
maximizing their own recoveries.103 For instance, it is
common for lawyers involved in protracted litigation to feel
immense pressure to settle their cases, as doing so
guarantees that they will recover at least some of the
expenses and fees that they have incurred in litigating the
case thus far.104 Certain aspects of class action litigation
create a uniquely high risk that these pressures will drive
class counsel to inadequately represent their clients and
seek settlements that are contrary to the class’s interests.105
For example, defendants in class action suits will commonly
tell class counsel that they will only agree to enter into a
settlement if counsel can get all (or substantially all) of the
plaintiff class to agree to be bound by it.106 These all-ornothing style settlement offers place substantial pressure
on class counsel to get every class member to agree to the
proposed settlement, even if doing so requires them to
mislead, deceive, or bully their clients into doing so.107
Similar disregard for class members’ interests can be seen
in the collusive “sweetheart deals”108 or “reverse auctions”109
103. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 391
(2000) (discussing reasons why class counsel are typically more risk averse than
class members); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements
Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1657 (2008) (highlighting the interest of
class counsel in quickly achieving a settlement); Susan P. Koniak & George M.
Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1056 (1996) (arguing
that lawyer abuse in class actions is rampant); Macey & Miller, supra note 61,
at 12-13 (“[Attorneys’] interests are rarely perfectly aligned with those of the
client.”).
104. Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 470-74
(2000).
105. Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV.
1137, 1171-72 (2010).
106. Erichson, supra note 90, at 979.
107. Id. at 1018-19.
108. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation:
Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
877, 883 (1987) (“The classic agency cost problem in class actions involves the
‘sweetheart’ settlement, in which the plaintiff’s attorney trades a high fee award
for a low recovery.”); George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls
of Mass Tort Class Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 521, 530 (1997) (recognizing the
sweetheart settlement as the “most basic concern” voiced by academic critics of
the class action). Sweetheart settlements have been widely documented in the
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that occur in the settlement class context.110 In these
situations, class counsel agree to settle class claims for less
than they are worth and defendants award counsel with
either higher than normal attorneys’ fees or, if certification
has not yet occurred and multiple attorneys are seeking to
represent the class, by agreeing to consent to class counsel’s
proposed representation of the class.111 These types of selfdealing settlement agreements are particularly likely in the
class action context because it is only in exceedingly rare
situations that members of the class will monitor class

context of settlement-only class actions. See generally Roger C. Cramton,
Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and “Settlement Class Actions”: An
Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811 (1995) (discussing the conflicts created by
sweetheart settlements, notably where defendant’s counsel selects plaintiffs’
counsel and where future claimants are absent from the proceedings); Darren
M. Franklin, The Mass Tort Defendants Strike Back: Are Settlement
Class Actions a Collusive Threat or Just a Phantom Menace?, 53 STAN. L. REV.
163 (2000) (critiquing sweetheart settlements as bad policy).
109. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1370-73 (1995). (“[A reverse auction is] a
jurisdictional competition among different teams of plaintiffs’ attorneys in
different actions that involve the same underlying allegations. The first team to
settle with the defendants in effect precludes the others . . . .”); Geoffrey P.
Miller, Competing Bids in Class Action Settlements, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 633
(2003) (suggesting ex post competing bids as a mechanism to solve the “reverse
auction” problem). Judge Posner discussed reverse auctions in Reynolds v.
Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 282-83 (7th Cir. 2002), noting, “[a]lthough
there is no proof that the settlement was actually collusive in the reverseauction sense, the circumstances demanded closer scrutiny than the district
judge gave it.” See also Crawford v. Equifax Payment Servs., 201 F.3d 877, 882
(7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting class settlement because “Crawford and his attorney
were paid handsomely to go away; the other class members received nothing . . .
and lost the right to pursue class relief”).
110. See Klement, supra note 102, at 45-46 (discussing the inability of courts
to obtain enough information to assess the adequacy of proposed settlements).
111. See Reynolds, 288 F.3d at 282-83 (“The ineffectual lawyers are happy to
sell out a class they anyway can’t do much for in exchange for generous
attorneys’ fees, and the defendants are happy to pay generous attorneys’ fees
since all they care about is the bottom line.”); Christopher R. Leslie, The
Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and Class Action Settlements,
59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 81 (2007) (stating that class counsel’s actions are rarely
monitored by class members because individual members rarely possess the
type of information and financial incentives that would encourage them to
become actively involved in the suit).

2012]

CLASS ACTIONS

779

counsel’s behavior.112 Again, the only check against these
abuses that can be found in Rule 23 is the requirement of
judicial approval of settlement via a fairness hearing.113
Examples of how this procedure has failed to safeguard
class members’ rights are legion.114
3. Failures to Screen Out Meritless Suits at Early Stages
of Litigation. The revised version of Rule 23 does not appear
to have any provisions that are specifically designed to
protect parties from overzealous plaintiffs’ attorneys’
potential abuse of the class action device. This should not be
surprising—since class action suits are merely another form
of civil suit, it would have made sense for the revisionists to
assume that the procedural devices created by other rules
(for example, Rule 12’s motions to dismiss, Rule 11’s
motions for sanctions) would provide sufficient protection to
parties involved in representative suits. Further, the
revisionists might have believed that the class certification
requirements set forth in 23(a) and (b) would weed out
frivolous class claims at an early stage of litigation.
Despite these procedural protections, opportunistic
plaintiffs’ attorneys have been able to engage in highly

112. The literature analyzing the class member-class counsel monitoring
problem is robust. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A
Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 625, 628-34 (1987) (discussing the effect of
the agency cost problem on class member participation); Theodore Eisenberg &
Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation:
Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1532 (2004) (finding
that class members rarely opt-out or object); Leslie, supra note 111, at 81; Adam
Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 512-13 (2011).
113. Richard Frankel, The Disappearing Opt-Out Right in Punitive-Damages
Class Actions, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 563, 616-19 (discussing the ineffectiveness of
the fairness hearing).
114. See, e.g., Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston, 100 F.3d 1348, 1352 (7th Cir.
1996) (denial of petition for rehearing) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (finding that
the attorneys behind the settlement of a class claim “may even put one over on
the court, in a staged performance”); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the
Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045,
1047-96 (1995) (discussing rampant collusion between plaintiffs’ counsel and
defendants in a massive asbestos class action suit and the failure of the
presiding court to protect the rights of class members); see also Reynolds, 288
F.3d at 282-83; Crawford v. Equifax Payment Servs., 201 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir.
2000).
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abusive uses of the class action device. 115 While popular
accounts give widely varying estimates as to the prevalence
of frivolous class action lawsuits, it is unquestionable both
that meritless suits are filed every year and that these suits
end up imposing significant costs on the parties that they
target.116 While strike suits are no stranger to non-class
litigation, they are a larger concern in the class action
context for several reasons. First, by aggregating the claims
of a large number of individuals into a single suit, a class
action greatly increases the potential losses an unfavorable
verdict could impose on defendants, making a defendant’s
stance on settlement a “bet-your-company decision” and
putting “insurmountable pressure on defendants to
115. Class action suits filed against breast implant manufacturers are one of
the most well-known examples of frivolous litigation. Despite the fact that there
was no scientific evidence in support of the claim that silicone breast implants
increased an individual’s risk for developing cancer, suits based on these claims
ended up driving Dow Corning, a Fortune 500 business, into bankruptcy. See
Peter A. Drucker, Class Certification and Mass Torts: Are “Immature” Tort
Claims Appropriate for Class Action Treatment?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 213,
221-24 (1998) (discussing the risk of sympathy for multitudes of plaintiffs
overriding logic in class action litigation); see also In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,
Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing a class action suit filed by
hemophiliacs against the supplier of AIDS-infected blood solids); In re Gen.
Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784-85
(3d Cir. 1995) (“[C]lass actions create the opportunity for a kind of legalized
blackmail [where] a greedy and unscrupulous plaintiff . . . use[s] the threat of a
large class action, which can be costly to the defendant, to extract a settlement
far in excess of the individual claims’ actual worth.”).
116. Compare In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288
F.3d 1012, 1015-16 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Aggregating millions of claims on account of
multiple products manufactured and sold across more than ten years makes the
case so unwieldy, and the stakes so large, that settlement becomes almost
inevitable—and at a price that reflects the risk of a catastrophic judgment as
much as, if not more than, the actual merit of the claims.”), In re Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d at 1298 (describing the intense pressure placed on
defendants to settle class actions), and David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A
Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 3, 3 (1985) (describing situations in which plaintiffs file meritless suits in
order to extort a settlement recovery from defendant), with Allan Kanner &
Tibor Nagy, Exploding the Blackmail Myth: A New Perspective on Class Action
Settlements, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 681, 682 (2005) (refuting the class action-aslegalized-blackmail argument as “neither objectively accurate nor legally
sound”), and Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and
Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003) (rejecting the class action-as-legalizedblackmail argument espoused by Handler, Friendly, Posner, and Easterbrook).
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settle.”117 This pressure is often sufficient to force
defendants to settle even when the merits of the underlying
claims are dubious.118 Second, the expansive discovery
obligations that defendants can be saddled with from the
very beginning of a class action suit compel defendants to
expend significant resources at the earliest stages of
litigation.119 Plaintiffs’ attorneys, well aware of this
dynamic, often seek to take advantage of it, harassing
defendants with extraordinarily broad discovery requests
and hoping that the prospect of handling similar requests
throughout pretrial proceedings will bully them into
agreeing to a premature settlement.120 The prevalence and
success of these practices establishes a major deficiency in
the status quo.
4. Use of Inept Mechanisms to Distribute Damages and
Settlement Awards. As discussed earlier, one of the reasons
117. Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001)
(“Such a claim puts a bet-your-company decision to . . . managers.”); Castano v.
Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Class certification creates
insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle.”); see also In re Visa
Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 148 (2d Cir. 2001) (Jacobs,
J., dissenting).
118. E.g., Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 547 F.3d 742, 745 (7th Cir.
2008) (discussing how the aggregation of claims creates a risk asymmetry that
pressures defendants into settling claims); In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc.
Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d at 1016; Szabo, 249 F.3d at 677; Milton
Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust
Suits—The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8-9
(1971) (stating that defendants facing massive antitrust class actions suits have
no choice but to settle and describing such suits as “legalized blackmail”).
119. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-59 (2007); see also JAMES
HAMILTON, PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995: LAW &
EXPLANATION 72 (1996) (stating that the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”) was intended to lower costs imposed on public companies
by combating frivolous “strike” suits); Adam C. Pritchard, Should Congress
Repeal Securities Class Action Reform?, POL’Y ANALYSIS, Feb. 27, 2003, at 1, 1
(“The high costs of litigation were a powerful weapon with which to coerce
companies to settle claims.”).
120. See, e.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558-59 (“The threat of discovery expense
will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching
[trial].”); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81
(2006) (stating that one of the main factors leading to the enactment of the
PSLRA was the legislature’s concern that abuses of the discovery process in
securities class actions were effectively strong-arming defendants into settling
meritless claims).
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the revisionists expanded access to the class action
procedural device was to enable parties to aggregate claims
whose small monetary worth made them effectively
unenforceable via traditional litigation. Expansion of the
availability of the class action device seems, at least
conceptually, like a viable way to ensure that the law
provides groups of individuals with small claims a feasible
way to recover what they are due. Unfortunately, even
when groups are able to obtain certification and establish
an opposing party’s liability, modern class action procedure
often fails to ensure that wronged individuals actually
receive compensation for their harms.
The main reason that the expansion of class action
litigation has not led to a greater number of aggrieved
plaintiffs being made whole is the high rate at which
members of successful suits fail to file award claims.121 It is
well established that class members in large class action
suits typically file claims at rates that are much lower than
one would expect.122 Indeed, one academic has estimated
that over ninety percent of class members will never claim
the damages relief that they are awarded by courts. 123
Commentators have ventured a variety of different
explanations for this phenomenon—the difficulty of
notifying class members, the overly complex and technical
notifications that class members receive, the effort required
to pursue a claim, the lack of interest of class members in
the types of relief available, and the failure of fund
designers to design claim procedures in ways that take into
121. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 20, at 427-30; Tiana Leia Russell,
Exporting Class Actions to the European Union, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 141, 149-50
(2010) (discussing the low settlement participation rates in American class
actions); Adam S. Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality, 59 DUKE L.J. 1105, 1107
(2010).
122. See Shay Lavie, Reverse Sampling: Holding Lotteries to Allocate the
Proceeds of Small-Claims Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1065, 1066-67
(2011) (“For many class members, it is not economically viable to redeem their
meager awards. The result is unclaimed compensatory damages commonly in
the range of millions of dollars.” (footnote omitted)); Leslie, supra note 111, at
119-20 (“In many cases, the vast majority of class members neglect to collect the
money due them under the settlement[,] . . . [w]hen settlements require class
members to file . . . proofs of claim in order to receive their share of the common
fund.”).
123. Zimmerman, supra note 121, at 1107.
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account cognitive biases.124 Regardless of the specific
reasons why claim rates are so low, it is evident that our
class action system has failed to ensure that parties who
have suffered legal harms are actually compensated for
their injuries.
5. Heavy Administrative Burden Placed on Courts. One
of the primary motivations that led to the adoption of the
current version of Rule 23 was a desire to exploit the
economies of scale offered by increased use of representative
litigation.125 By instituting a more liberal class certification
procedure, the revisionists thought they could make inroads
into reducing the backlog of suits building up in the federal
judiciary.126 Because class action suits could distill what
might have been numerous individualized suits into a single
unit of litigation and prevent repetitive litigation of the
same issues, the revisionists hoped that increasing the use
of such suits would take some of the burden off of the
overtaxed judiciary.127
The extent to which the armchair efficiencies of
representative litigation have panned out in the real world,
however, is questionable. First, data collected on class
action cases shows that these suits exert extraordinary
demands on the courts tasked with adjudicating them and
that class certification can actually increase the time it
124. See, e.g., Lavie, supra note 122, at 1066-68 (highlighting the difficulty in
locating class members and stating that is it often not economically viable for
class members to redeem awards); Martin H. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief and
the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical
Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617, 618-19 (2010) (noting the problems of meager
awards, difficulties in notifying class members of their awards, and the
uncertainty if absent class members are fully aware of their membership in the
class); Zimmerman, supra note 121, at 1155 (arguing that reforms have not
taken cognitive bias into account).
125. Kaplan, supra note 38, at 497; Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether
Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1110 (2006) (“Class actions generate
subsidies for litigants by relying on economies of scale to induce lawyers to serve
a wider set of claimants.”).
126. While comprehensive data is difficult to come by, a recent study done by
the Federal Judicial Center indicates that federal courts continue to experience
ever-increasing caseloads. JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL 21 (2011) (reporting that
civil case filings increased seven percent from 2006 to 2010 in the twenty-three
districts studied).
127. Kaplan, supra note 38, at 497.
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takes plaintiffs to recover on their claims.128 Second, the
supposed efficiency gains created by reducing duplicative
litigation have come under attack due to data showing that
consolidation has not occurred and that a large percentage
of the claims in federal class action suits overlap with
claims asserted in other federal suits.129 Third, as noted
earlier, the expansion of representative litigation has led to
an increase in the number of frivolous suits that are filed.130
It is unlikely that courts would have had to handle these
cases absent the revisionists’ reforms, and, hence, it is fair
to weigh the burdens that are imposed by such suits against
any efficiency gains that have resulted from the reforms.
Finally, suits involving representative parties, like other
complex civil matters, are a haven for highly inefficient
pretrial practices.131 Parties to class action suits commonly
engage in expansive discovery fishing expeditions, endless
attempts to score points via motion practice, and other
dilatory tactics. These behaviors have caused class action
suits to have pretrial phases that last years, worsening
courts’ already overwhelming caseloads and consuming an
immense amount of judicial resources.132 Taken together,
128. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY
MANAGEMENT 90 tbl. A-3 (1998); Dam, supra note 39, at 52; Frankel, supra note
113, at 616-18; cf. George E. Farrell, Multidistrict Litigation in Aviation
Accident Cases, 38 J. AIR L. & COM. 159, 161-62 (1972) (noting that pretrial
consolidation of aviation accident cases increases the workload of the courts).
129. THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE IMPACT
CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: THIRD
INTERIM REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RULES 24 tbl. 1 (2007) (“[A]pproximately 37% of class actions overlapped with or
duplicated other federal class actions.”).
OF THE

130. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
131. See THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 56-58 (1996) (discussing the
myriad objections raised by class members at settlement hearings); Roger
Bernstein, Judicial Economy and Class Actions, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 360-63
(1978) (analyzing a sample of cases filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
and the Southern District of New York and finding that attorney time
consumption—including judicial and nonjudicial time—in class actions is
between 1.1 and 3.4 times that of nonclass actions).
132. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 551-56 (E.D.
La. 2009) (describing the factual background and procedural posture of the
dispute); Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. (In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig.),
Nos. 1203, 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042, at *1-6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000)
(discussing the procedural history of the case leading up to its disposition);
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these effects have frustrated the hope that expanded use of
representative litigation would ease judicial burdens.
B. Public Harms
The shortcomings in modern class action procedure
identified in Part II.A do not exclusively harm parties who
are actively involved in class action suits, but impose
serious costs on the public as a whole. These society-wide
impacts have not received much attention in discussions of
class action procedure, which have tended to focus on the
consequences that our rules have for the litigants and
judges involved in suits. While omitting discussion of the
broader impacts of modern class action practice might be
harmless in the context of other reform proposals, analysis
of these effects is mandatory here, as they play an
important role in the Public Advocate reform proposed in
Part III.
Just as a well-functioning class action system benefits
the public, a set of poorly operating procedures harms the
public. Take, for instance, the failure of the current system
to grant class certification to plaintiffs whose claims merit
group treatment.133 While this practice obviously has its
most direct impact on the individuals before the court, it
also creates tangible harms for members of the public.
When courts consistently deny class certification for claims
based on consumer protection laws, for instance, courts
signal to private actors that they can violate these laws
without having to fear that they will be held accountable.134
While transgressors might still face liability stemming from
Dawn M. Barrios, Practitioner’s Note, The Long and Winding Road for
Spitzfaden, Louisiana’s Breast Implant Class Action: Ad Astra per Aspera, 74
TUL. L. REV. 1941 (2000) (detailing the timeline of breast implant class action
litigation in Louisiana from the perspective of one plaintiffs’ counsel).
133. See supra Part II.A.1.
134. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 77; Deborah R. Hensler & Thomas
D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond “It Just Ain’t Worth It”: Alternative Strategies for Damage
Class Action Reform, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring/Summer 2001, at 137,
146 (arguing that absent the threat of liability to an entire class of individuals,
defendants will be free to cause small harms to individuals without regard for
legal restrictions); Patrick A. Luff, Bad Bargains: The Mistake of Allowing CostBenefit Analyses in Class Action Certification Decisions, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 65,
74-78 (2010) (discussing the importance of the deterrence function of class
action suits).
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individual suits, the deterrent effect of such suits is
magnitudes smaller than that of representative actions.135
Further, individualized actions are unlikely to deter parties
from committing minor infractions, given that the costs of
filing such suits will usually outweigh any potential
recovery.136 Less deterrence will lead to a greater number of
violations, further harm to citizens, and will undermine the
efficacy of the laws themselves.137 These violations, of
course, are harms in and of themselves, but the consequent
inability of individuals to seek relief from them can lead to
secondary, less tangible harms, such as feelings of political
helplessness or antipathy towards the legal system.
Some of the status quo’s most harmful public impacts
can be attributed to its failure to adequately recognize the
broader societal impacts that the verdicts and settlements
reached in representative suits will have on non-parties.
Consider, for example, a hypothetical class action suit
brought by the owners of a certain model of car that alleges
that a defect in brake installation has caused a number of
serious accidents. Assume further that, because the
installation was clearly faulty, that class counsel and the
manufacturer have agreed to a settlement agreement that
will permit class members to obtain new brakes, absolve the
manufacturer of liability for brake-related claims, and (of
course) award class counsel a hefty fee. The parties would
submit this settlement for judicial approval, emphasizing
the ways in which it would benefit both parties.138 With only
this information before it, a court would likely find that
such a settlement constitutes a fair deal for the parties and

135. See, e.g., Landsman & Funk PC v. Skinder-Strauss Assocs., 640 F.3d 72,
94-95 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing the greater deterrent effect of class action suits);
In re Am. Reserve Corp., 840 F.2d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 1988) (discussing the role
that class action suits have in deterring corporations from engaging in unlawful
conduct); Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 676 & n.43 (7th Cir. 1981) (same).
136. See Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 547 F.3d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2008)
(stating that, absent class actions, many small claims would never be litigated);
see also sources cited supra notes 114-15.
137. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 77-78.
138. Frankel, supra note 113, at 617-18; Susan P. Koniak, How Like a Winter?
The Plight of Absent Class Members Denied Adequate Representation, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1787, 1797-98 (2004); Leslie, supra note 111, at 86.
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approve it.139 Given class counsel and the manufacturer’s
interests in seeing the settlement approved, neither is likely
to highlight the potentially significant public burdens that
would flow from the settlement and, absent an advocate,
such concerns will receive little consideration. Unless the
settlement is structured properly, it is likely that most class
members will fail to redeem the free repair offer,140 and
accidents caused by the defect will continue to pile up,
inflicting physical and economic harms on third parties.
Additionally, because the proposed settlement imposes
minimal costs on the car manufacturer, it will signal to
automobile companies that the penalties for producing
unsafe products will be minimal and increase the likelihood
that such products will enter and remain in the market. A
real world example of these types of public externalities can
be seen in the proposed Google Books settlement.141 If it had
been accepted, the settlement would have had massive
impacts on individuals who were not before the court: at
minimum, it would have (1) pushed all future creators of
written works into a contractual relationship with Google,
(2) increased individuals’ ability to access out-of-print
written works, and (3) imposed a Google-centric structure
on the digital books market that the entire public would
have had no choice but to accept.142
The other flaws in modern class action practice noted
earlier are also responsible for public harms:

139. See, e.g., Christopher Jensen, Judge Approves Preliminary Settlement of
Honda Brake Suit, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (May 3, 2010, 10:58 AM),
http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/judge-approves-preliminary-settlem
ent-of-honda-brake-suit/; see also J. Brendan Day, Comment, My Lawyer Went to
Court and All I Got Was This Lousy Coupon! The Class Action Fairness Act’s
Inadequate Provision for Judicial Scrutiny Over Proposed Coupon Settlements,
38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1085, 1116-21 (2008) (discussing the rubber-stamp
nature of judicial settlement reviews).
140. See sources cited supra Part II.A.5.
141. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
142. See generally Frosio, supra note 9 (discussing the Google Books project
and the proceedings in Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666
(S.D.N.Y. 2011)); Samuelson, supra note 11, at 1308-11 (discussing the
ramifications that judicial approval of the Google Books settlement would have
had); Glorioso, supra note 9, at 971 (summarizing the goals of the Google Books
project).
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● The inability of class action procedures to adequately
distribute damages awards and ensure that class members’
interests are sufficiently represented have fostered popular
skepticism about the worth of representative litigation.143
This skepticism has led to less public interest in becoming
involved in representative litigation, which, in turn, has
reduced the likelihood that injured individuals will ever be
compensated for harms they have suffered. Further, there
are signs that members of the judiciary have become
skeptical of the worth of class actions, perhaps leading them
to subject such suits to heavy scrutiny and deny requests for
class certification (or rule against classes on other motions)
that should have been granted.144
● The current system’s failure to screen out meritless
suits at an early stage of litigation most directly impacts
members of the public in their roles as consumers.
Corporations, the typical targets of such suits, end up
having to spend significant sums to litigate and settle these
suits, and these costs end up being passed on to those who
purchase these companies’ goods and services.145 Coercive
class action suits also harm the public by causing
corporations to avoid entering markets with high liability
exposures and impairing the ability of the public to obtain
certain types of goods.146
● The heavy administrative burden that class action
suits have placed on courts, as well as the frivolous suits
that Rule 23 has enabled, have impeded the public’s ability
143. See Adam Liptak, When a Lawsuit Is Too Big, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2011, at
WK1 (discussing the criticisms of class action litigation articulated by leading
academics and jurists).
144. See id.
145. See Samuel M. Hill, Small Claimant Class Actions: Deterrence and Due
Process Examined, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 147, 150 (1995) (“Some commentators
and judges recognize that this . . . begs the question of whether it is ‘fair’ or
‘efficient’ to spend vast private and judicial resources to produce little or no
benefit for the plaintiff class members, while generating a huge fee for class
counsel.”).
146. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., The Supreme Court’s Common Law
Approach to Excessive Punitive Damage Awards, 60 S.C. L. REV. 881, 904 (2009)
(discussing how non-meritorious class action suits filed against a drug
manufacturer ended up “depriving women of the only Food and Drug
Administration-approved medication that blunted the hard symptoms of
morning sickness”).
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to obtain efficient adjudication of suits they file in federal
court and imposed costs on public coffers.147
Given the above, it is clear that the public has a large
interest in the way that class action suits are litigated.
Because of the significance of this interest, it stands to
reason that courts should take the public’s interest into
account when adjudicating these suits. Modern procedural
rules, however, provide no guarantee that the public’s
interest will be taken into account in any manner at any
point in the adjudication of a class action suit. Given the
dyadic adversarial nature of American procedure, it is
typically the case that the only views considered by the
court are those of the opposing parties. It is rarely (if ever)
the case that the public’s interest completely overlaps with
the interests of either party; it is similarly uncommon for
there to be significant judicial advocacy on the behalf of the
public’s interest.148
That class action procedure fails to formally recognize
the public’s interest in the proper resolution of claims
should be considered one of the construct’s primary
deficiencies. Not only is reforming the federal rules to
address this concern an important goal in and of itself, but,
as will be discussed in the following Part, such reform could
also prove to be an effective way to combat the other
problems plaguing representative litigation.
III. HOW TO FIX CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
This Part proposes a novel solution—the introduction of
Public Advocates to federal class actions—that has the
potential to resolve the issues described above and revitalize
147. See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
148. Judicial advocacy of this type is rare both because it would likely be
viewed as compromising a judge’s ability to fulfill her institutional role as a
dispassionate adjudicator and because the structure of our court system
prevents judges from being able to effectively take such advocacy positions. See
Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Bank, 77 F.R.D. 382, 383 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (“To require
the judge to occupy an adversary position . . . is highly inconsistent with his
acknowledged duty to act as an impartial arbitrator. The appointment of a
guardian for the class obviates this considerable problem of judicial
schizophrenia.”); see also Paula Batt Wilson, Note, Attorney Investment in Class
Action Litigation: The Agent Orange Example, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 291, 33638 (1994) (discussing the institutional barriers that prevent judges from being
able to act as advocates on behalf of class members).
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modern class action practice. It begins by looking at the
current state of representative litigation from a macro-level
perspective and discusses, at a similarly abstract level, the
types of reform that could remedy the status quo’s maladies.
Next, the Public Advocate proposal is set forth: detailed
descriptions are given of the role that Public Advocates
would play in suits, where Public Advocates could be
situated within the federal government, and the ways in
which Public Advocates resemble advocates that our legal
system has recognized in other areas of law. Finally, an
examination of the reasons why this reform would help
eliminate collective litigation’s shortcomings is provided.
A. What Kind of Reform Is Needed?
Given the large number of problems identified with
modern class action practice, it is somewhat surprising that
the majority of suggested reforms have consisted of minor
doctrinal modifications, tweaks to pre-existing rules, or
changes that would affect only a single phase of litigation.149
Given the seeming consensus among scholars that the
status quo is broken, one would expect such a state of
disrepair to prompt proposals introducing bigger, bolder,
and more comprehensive changes to how things currently
operate. The reform set forth in this Article embraces the
idea that large problems require large solutions and,
accordingly, advocates changing one of the fundamental
aspects of class action litigation.
Identifying which aspect of the status quo should be
modified and how it should be changed is a complicated
task, and one that is more art (or guesswork) than science.
This Article’s attempt begins with the observation that, for
the most part, class action suits proceed in a manner much
149. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 109, at 1421-57 (outlining a number of
doctrinal and procedural changes that could address problems associated with
modern class action suits); Linda S. Mullenix, Dropping the Spear: The Case for
Enhanced Summary Judgment Prior to Class Certification, 43 AKRON L. REV.
1197, 1197-1203, 1242-43 (2010) (recommending modifying Rule 23 to explicitly
authorize courts to hear summary judgment motions before approving or
denying requests for class certification); Tidmarsh, supra note 105, at 1139
(advocating for a “recasting” of the doctrine of adequate representation); Weber,
supra note 70, at 1193 (arguing for an emphasis on class member consent);
Woolley, supra note 70, at 604 (arguing for the right of class members to
participate).
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like traditional non-class suits. Both forms of litigation see
two (or more) adversarial parties contesting matters
through the same discrete phases of litigation—pleading,
discovery, trial, and post-trial—in front of a judge, who is
charged with deciding which party should prevail on all of
the legal issues that arise. While there are procedural
differences between these two types of suits—most notably
the class certification and counsel selection processes as
well as the modification of rules concerning notice and
settlement—their similarities outweigh their differences.
Yet, if the two types of suits are really so similar, why is
it that representative suits capture advantages and create
problems that non-representative suits do not? The answer
lies in recognition of the fact that very different sets of
interests tend to be implicated by class and non-class
litigation. As established earlier,150 the size and scope of the
issues addressed in representative suits—and the large
positive and negative externalities associated with the
resolution of these suits—cause them to bear on public
interests in a way that traditional litigation does not.
The procedural rules governing both types of suits
contain no recognition of this difference. This disconnect,
coupled with the fact that modern class action practices
harm public interests, identifies a deficiency in current
procedural law and suggests an area where reform would be
particularly fruitful. While it would be unfair to attribute
all of the problems associated with modern class action
practice to the system’s failure to incorporate the public’s
interests in the adjudication of suits, creating a formalized
process to recognize the public issues at play in
representative suits could fix a number of problems.
There are a variety of procedural reforms that could be
instituted in order to ensure that the public’s interest is
considered during the adjudication of class action suits. For
instance, Rule 23 could be changed so that subsection (a) of
the Rule requires prospective classes to show that
certification of a class is in the public’s interest.
Alternatively, Rule 23(e) could be modified so that it
requires judges to determine that a settlement is in the
public’s interest at settlement fairness hearings. Such
reforms would be in line with the conservative reform
150. See supra Part II.B.
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proposals that other commentators have offered.151 Because
analysis of every modification of this type would be a
Herculean task, this Article focuses on exploring a single,
less modest reform: mandating that federal suits involving
proposed or certified classes include Public Advocates—
government attorneys charged with representing the
public’s interests—as third-party litigants.152
B. The Public Advocate Proposal
The reform beneath the Public Advocate proposal is
relatively simple—lawmakers would alter existing
procedural law to require that Public Advocates be included
as third-party litigants in all suits involving actual or
proposed Rule 23 classes. By adding a litigant that is
focused on representing the public’s interest to the most
problematic class action suits, this reform would directly
address a fundamental flaw in modern procedure—the
failure of the system to ensure that courts consider the
public impacts of their decisions.153 Further, this change
would help address the problems with class action litigation
that were identified in Part II: the failure of courts to certify
proposed classes that should have their claims heard on a
class basis, the fact that class counsel and judges regularly
ignore the interests of class members, and the inability of
the status quo to screen out frivolous suits.154 Before

151. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 149.
152. The idea that class action litigation would benefit from the introduction of
a third-party has been a part of other reform proposals. For a discussion of the
history of third-party intervention in class actions and the benefits associated
with such interventions, see Edward Brunet, Improving Class Action Efficiency
by Expanded Use of Parens Patriae Suits and Intervention, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1919
(2000).
153. It is worth noting that public interest groups have, on occasion,
successfully intervened into suits and represented the public interest. See
Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness
Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403, 456-63 (describing several public
interest groups’ actions and summarizing the results of studies analyzing such
groups’ contributions to the suits they intervened in). While it appears as
though these groups help combat the problems identified in Part II, they lack
the resources to become involved in more than a handful of suits and, hence,
cannot be relied on to fix the system’s problems. Id. at 449.
154. See infra Part III.C.2.
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considering such matters, however, a more detailed
description of the Public Advocate is necessary.
1. The Role Public Advocates Would Play in Class Action
Suits. Public Advocate positions would be created within the
federal government and staffed with attorneys experienced
in litigating class action suits. As described in Part III.B.3,
these individuals would be distributed across the country
and would be responsible for representative suits filed
within their jurisdictions. Public Advocates would join any
suit filed in federal court that involved class-based claims.155
Public Advocates would have standing similar to that of
third-party litigants who intervene in a suit in accordance
with Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.156 They
would possess full authority to file briefs and motions
concerning any matters that arise during the course of
litigation—for example, motions to dismiss, motions for
sanctions, petitions supporting or opposing class
certification, motions for summary judgment, motions to be
considered at settlement fairness hearings, and so on.
Additionally, as parties to the suit, they would be able to
participate in pretrial conferences and the discovery
process.157 Like the principal parties to the action, Public
Advocates would be able to express their views on the
reasonableness of the parties’ proposed timetables and the
adequacy of their disclosures to the court during pretrial
conferences or by filing separate motions. In essence, as well
155. As part of the larger reform, the legislature would enact a procedural rule
requiring that parties notify the appropriate circuit’s Public Advocate office
when filing a suit involving class-based claims. Additionally, trial courts would
be able to contact their jurisdiction’s office and indicate that one of its cases
contains representative claims.
156. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24. Because inclusion of Public Advocates in federal
suits involving classes would be mandatory, Public Advocates would not have to
abide by the notice requirements set forth in Rule 24(c). This Article does not
advocate for the introduction of a procedural mechanism for handling the
addition of Public Advocates to suits, but this aspect of the proposed reform
should not be problematic. The legislature could pass a statute that recognizes
the public’s interest in the adjudication of class action suits and vests the power
to represent this interest in Public Advocates.
157. While it is unlikely that Public Advocates would have the resources
needed to review all of the materials disclosed by the parties, even limited
involvement would put them in a good position to police the parties’ behavior
and raise objections when egregious abuses occur. For an example of how this
would pan out in practice, see infra note 164.
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as in procedural capability, Public Advocates would be
endowed with (and limited to) all of the abilities that the
main parties to actions possess.
Given this identity of procedural capability, it should be
clear that the Public Advocate proposal does not attempt to
revolutionize representative litigation by adding a new
player to class action suits that possesses powers that the
currently existing players lack. This reform also does not
attempt to revolutionize representative action litigation by
rewriting the procedural rules governing how courts handle
class-based claims. Rather, the reform simply seeks to
increase the quality of the existing structure’s output by
introducing a litigant who will ensure that the public’s
interests are duly recognized.158
2. How Public Advocates Determine What Is in the
“Public’s Interest.” Given that the defining characteristic of
Public Advocates is the fact that they represent the
interests of the public, a critical aspect of the reform is how
“the public’s interest” is determined. Abstracted away from
a specific factual situation, it is difficult to provide a
description of “the public’s interest” that is not either
uselessly vague or tautological. Most simply put, anything
that creates a net benefit for members of the public will be
in the public’s interest. Conversely, anything that causes a
net harm to the public will be contrary to the public’s
interest. While accurate, these descriptions are not
particularly helpful as they do not explain what “net
benefit” and “net harm” mean in this context. Rather than
continue too far down the rabbit hole of analytic term
definition, it will suffice to say that one can think of “net
benefits” as the types of efficiency and equity gains that
were discussed in Part I and “net harms” as the detrimental
effects outlined in Part II.
Thankfully, whereas generating a description of what
constitutes the “public’s interest” in the abstract is difficult,
defining the concept by providing examples of how it applies
in particular situations is easy. Three hypothetical class
action suits that have critical motions either pending or
potentially pending are described below. For each suit, a
sample analysis is provided of the way that a Public
158. Their role would not be dissimilar from that played by Public Advocatelike attorneys in Section 303 administrative hearings by the U.S. International
Trade Commission. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
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Advocate assigned to these cases might determine what
actions she should take to satisfy her duty to represent the
public’s interest.
● Hypothetical #1—A suit has been filed on behalf of
all individuals who purchased SkinnyWoman Margarita
Mix—a low calorie cocktail mix marketed towards uppercrust party-goers who are watching their waistlines—
against the product’s manufacturer. The complaint alleges
that, due to the manufacturer’s negligence, every bottle of
the mix produced in the past two years had been
contaminated with certain manufacturing waste products.
The Public Advocate assigned to this case is currently
debating whether to file a memorandum in support of or
against class certification. While she recognizes that the
proposed class poses certain manageability problems (such
as the identification and provision of notice to class
members), she also feels as though the class members’
claims are similar enough that adjudicating them in a class
suit would provide large efficiency gains over individualized
litigation. Further, documents produced by the plaintiffs
indicate that the class claims are probably meritorious,
reducing her concerns that this is a frivolous suit that will
end up negatively impacting the public’s ability to enjoy
affordably-priced adult beverages. Finally, she is aware that
drink manufacturers have increasingly been releasing
contaminated products into the stream of commerce and all
indications are that, absent a strong deterrent, this trend is
unlikely to stop. Taking all of these factors into
consideration, the Public Advocate determines that it is in
the public’s interest to support class certification.
● Hypothetical #2—A federal court recently certified a
plaintiff class in the Frankelle v. Zarinne Fabrics case. The
class complaint alleges that Zarinne Fabrics owns textile
mills that have made improper use of dangerous chemicals,
that large groups of tourists were exposed to these
chemicals while taking the mildly popular behind-thescenes tour of these plants, and that these individuals now
face an increased risk of developing certain skin cancers. In
the course of doing a targeted review of documents produced
by the parties, the Public Advocate working on this suit
discovered a series of e-mails that conclusively prove there
is extremely little scientific support for plaintiffs’ claims,
and there doesn’t appear to be evidence establishing that
the class members were actually exposed to dangerous
chemicals. Upon notifying Ms. Beansimmon, the in-house
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lawyer representing Zarinne Fabrics, he is surprised to
learn that, despite the strength of this evidence, Ms.
Beansimmon is recommending that the company continue
with discovery. Zarinne Fabrics intends to follow her advice,
waiting to file a motion for summary judgment until
plaintiffs have complied with their onerous discovery
requests and the company has had the chance to identify
every document that could support its motion. Given that
the suit is based upon meritless claims, the Public Advocate
feels as though further litigation can serve no public
interest and that it would benefit the judicial system to
have this case removed from the courts as soon as possible.
Because he can find no countervailing public interest that
weighs against his intuition, he decides that it is his duty to
immediately file a motion seeking summary judgment
against plaintiffs’ claims.
● Hypothetical #3—Stockholders of Brava Cable
Entertainment filed a high-profile securities fraud suit
against the company several months ago. The parties have
been attempting to come to an agreement concerning the
scope and timing of discovery, but negotiations reached a
standstill several weeks ago over the disclosure of
documents related to a specific issue. Both sides have filed a
series of discovery-related motions with the judge, and the
Public Advocate assigned to the case is considering whether
she should weigh in on the matter. After reviewing the
parties’ motions, the Public Advocate feels as though the
requests and arguments being advanced by both parties are
reasonable. Further, at this stage of the proceedings, she
cannot tell whether a pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant ruling
on this particular issue would be in the public’s interest.
Due to this ambivalence the Public Advocate decides that
she should not file a motion on this issue.
These hypothetical scenarios highlight several
important aspects of the “public’s interest” concept and the
role that Public Advocates would (and, perhaps more
importantly, would not) play in class action suits. First, it
should be clear that Public Advocates are meant to consider
“the public’s interest” as it exists as an analytic construct,
not as an empirical fact (i.e., not as whatever interest the
majority of individuals actually hold). Public Advocates
would use their best judgment to analyze the facts of the
case before them and determine what actions are likely to
create the best result for the public. Second, Public
Advocates will not consistently side with either plaintiffs or
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defendants. Whether the public’s interest aligns with those
of the plaintiffs or defendants will depend entirely on casespecific facts, so one would expect Public Advocates to
exhibit bipartisan tendencies across different cases. Finally,
when a contested issue in a case does not raise significant
public concerns or when it is unclear which result would
benefit the public, Public Advocates will abstain from
weighing in on how it should be resolved.
While the Public Advocate assigned to a case will end
up
bearing
ultimate
responsibility
for
making
determinations as to what is in the public’s interest, their
discretion will be cabined by several institutional factors.
First, as discussed in the following Part, there will be a
head attorney in each Public Advocate office, and part of
this individual’s duties will be supervising their office’s
Public Advocates. Not only will these supervisors hold
Public Advocates accountable for their decisions, but they
will also assist Public Advocates in making difficult
determinations. Second, the Public Advocate Organization,
also discussed below, will issue guidelines describing
specific factors that Public Advocates must consider when
deciding what actions to take. These guidelines would
largely track the different issues discussed in Part II, but
would also describe specific issues and behaviors that have
been identified as being of concern to the public. By
providing a standard by which a Public Advocate’s interest
determinations can be judged, the guidelines would help
ensure that the public interest analysis is being conducted
in a consistent manner.
3. Where Public Advocates Fit Within the Federal
Government’s Infrastructure. Another important issue to
address is how Public Advocates would function on
organizational and administrative levels. While it is not
necessary to discuss the minutiae of how the Public
Advocate reform could be instituted, it is vital to describe
where these attorneys would fit in the federal government’s
umbrella of organizations and how the Public Advocate
program would be structured internally.159 Fleshing out
159. It should be noted that there is nothing about the Public Advocate
proposal that would prevent it from being enacted at a state, rather than
federal, level. Given the larger degree of variation in state class action laws and
the smaller political hurdles associated with enacting state-level reforms, it is
actually more likely that a state would adopt the proposal.
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these types of details demonstrates the pragmatic nature of
the proposal and provides insight into the types of political
forces that will affect Public Advocates.
The Public Advocate Organization (“PAO”) would
govern all Public Advocates. Drawing heavily from the way
that the Federal Public Defender program has been
organized, the PAO would operate within the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.160 The PAO itself
would contain thirteen offices, with each office being tasked
with handling suits that arise within their designated
federal circuit.161 The head Public Advocate for each office
would be appointed by a majority vote of the judges of the
relevant court of appeals and would serve a four-year
term.162 The head Public Advocate for an office would have
the authority to hire attorneys and personnel, with such
authority being contingent on the approval of the relevant
court of appeals and the Director of the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts.163 Each circuit’s head would be
responsible for supervising his or her office and, as
discussed earlier, would regularly provide Public Advocates
with guidance.
The Federal Public Defender system is a strong model
for the Public Advocate proposal to copy for several reasons.
First, modeling the organization of the PAO after the
Federal Public Defender system allows the Public Advocate
proposal to utilize an organizational blueprint that has
already proven to be viable. Second, by hosting the PAO in
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and vesting
Article III judges with the power to select head Public
Advocates, this structure isolates Public Advocates from
certain political forces. Because Public Advocates will often
be involved in cases that are of great importance to powerful
political bodies and corporations, it is crucial that the PAO
be structured in a way that provides Public Advocates with
as much protection from coercion as possible. Third,
dividing the PAO’s operational bodies into circuit-specific
offices and permitting these subdivisions to handle hiring
160. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2006) (setting forth the organizational structure of
the Federal Public Defender program).
161. See id. § 3006A(2)(A).
162. See id.
163. See id.
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decisions allows the PAO to enjoy a large degree of
flexibility when it comes to staffing. This flexibility is
important given the large variation in the number and type
of class action suits that are filed in different jurisdictions.
Giving the head Public Advocates of each subdivision
control over staffing decisions will help guarantee that
circuits that handle a large number of suits with certain
types of claims (e.g., derivatives suits or mass tort cases)
have Public Advocates with experience in the relevant
areas, as well as help ensure that different divisions are not
chronically under- or over-staffed.
4. Why Public Advocates Are Novel, But Not “Too
Novel”—Analogous Legal Entities. When confronted with
the Public Advocate proposal, skeptics might object that the
proposal is not feasible because it is based around the
creation of an entity that is unlike any that our legal system
has recognized. While it is true that the Public Advocates do
not have any identical comparators in the American legal
system, they would not be utterly unique. Indeed, the roles
played by attorneys in a number of situations are analogous
to that of the Public Advocate:
● When the U.S. International Trade Commission
institutes a Section 337 trademark investigation, it assigns
one of its staff attorneys to serve as a “Commission
Investigative Attorney” who serves as an independent trial
attorney whose primary function is to protect the public
interest by ensuring that all issues are fully explored and
that a complete factual and legal record is developed. The
Staff Attorney fully participates in discovery and may
present witnesses at trademark hearings.164
● Numerous
states have appointed “Consumer
Advocates,” whose duties include representing the public’s
164. Michael L. Doone & Peter D. Martine, Frequently Asked Questions
Regarding Section 337, INT’L TRADE COMM’N TRIAL LAW. ASS’N,
http://www.itctla.org/faq.cfm (last visited April 1, 2012); see also AM. BAR. ASS’N,
INT’L TRADE COMM’N, 1988 SEC. PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT 269, 270
(1988) (“[B]ut for the [Commission Investigative Attorney’s] performance . . .
fewer Section 337 investigations would be fully and fairly adjudicated and fewer
settlement agreements would be affirmed by the Commission.”); Jack Q. Lever,
Jr., Unfair Methods of Competition in Import Trade: Actions Before the
International Trade Commission, 41 BUS. LAW. 1165, 1182 (1986) (“[The
Commision Investigative Attorney] will not independently take discovery but,
instead, will monitor and participate in the discovery taken by the parties.”).
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interest in all regulatory hearings and civil proceedings
involving utilities-related matters.165
● Many states permit courts to appoint attorneys to
serve as guardians ad litem for minors (who are generally
deemed incapable of representing their own interests and
who would otherwise have no independent representation)
in family law matters.166
● Courts have occasionally appointed attorneys to act as
guardians ad litem representing the interests of absent
class members in disputes concerning whether proposed
settlements and class counsel fees are reasonable.167
Similarly, federal bankruptcy rules authorize a trustee to
conduct widespread inquiries concerning “the acts, conduct,
or property or . . . the liabilities and financial condition of
the debtor, or . . . any matter which may affect the
administration of the debtor’s estate” upon a demonstration
of cause during discovery.168
These examples are sufficient to rebuff skepticism about
whether introducing Public Advocates to class action suits
is a procedurally viable solution.169 Even though the
165. See, e.g., 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/5 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 8-1-1-1
to 8-1-1-4.1 (West 2012); IOWA CODE § 475A.1-A.5 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 654-118 (2011).
166. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 372 (West 2004); FLA. STAT. § 61.403
(2011); MINN. STAT. § 518.165 (2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, §§ 107.3, 109 (2006).
167. In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1996) (appointing an
individual to serve as guardian ad litem for the subclass of plaintiffs with future
claims and ordering him to make sure this subclass’s interests were not ignored
by class counsel); Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Bank, 77 F.R.D. 382, 383 (W.D. Pa.
1977) (appointing an attorney as “guardian ad litem and counsel . . . to
represent the interests of the class in conjunction with the determination of
reasonable fees for class counsel”); Miller v. Mackey Int’l, Inc., 70 F.R.D. 533,
535 (S.D. Fla. 1976) (same); see also Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future of
Class Actions, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 923, 949-51 (1998) (discussing the desirability of
appointing an independent representative for claimants to combat the risk that
class counsel will fail to advocate on behalf of the entire class).
168. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004; Greg M. Zipes, Discovery Abuse in the Civil
Adversary System: Looking to Bankruptcy’s Regime of Mandatory Disclosure and
Third Party Control Over the Discovery Process for Solutions, 27 CUMB. L. REV.
1107, 1142 (1997).
169. While this Article does not propose a specific mechanism for
implementing the Public Advocate proposal, one way in which this reform could
be enacted is discussed supra note 156.

2012]

CLASS ACTIONS

801

introduction of Public Advocates to class action suits would
affect a major change in the way such suits operate, the role
that they would play is not entirely foreign to our legal
system and has been recognized in a number of different
contexts.
C. How Public Advocates Would Help Fix Class Action
Litigation
Having addressed both the role that Public Advocates
would play in class action suits and the way that the Public
Advocate reform could be instituted, it is time to discuss
how introduction of such advocates would improve
representative litigation.
1. Specific Actions Public Advocates Would Take to
Advance the Public’s Interest. Part II identified five aspects
of modern class action litigation that are responsible for the
device’s troubled state. Once involved in a suit, Public
Advocates would be able to directly address each of these
problems:
● Public Advocates could combat inappropriate denials
of class certification by filing motions in support of
certification;
● Public Advocates could address the inept way that
damages or settlement funds are distributed by advocating
that courts only permit the use of distribution techniques
that have been empirically proven to be effective;
● Public Advocates could fight the misrepresentation
and non-recognition of the interests of class members and
the public by objecting to collusive or otherwise unfair
settlement proposals;
● Public Advocates could help courts screen out
meritless suits by filing motions to dismiss, motions
opposing class certification, and motions seeking summary
judgment; and
● Public Advocates could further help reduce the burden
that representative litigation imposes on courts by filing
motions in opposition to abusive discovery requests and
schedules, as well as by moving to have suits with
overlapping claims consolidated.
2. Why Actions Taken by Public Advocates Would
Improve Class Action Suits. Simply reciting the actions that
Public Advocates could take to address these problems,
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however, does not fully explain why introduction of Public
Advocates would succeed in rehabilitating the status quo.
Skeptics of the proposal might point out that the majority of
the motions filed by Public Advocates would likely be
duplicative of those that are already filed by one of the
parties. Why, they would ask, should we believe that the
actions taken by Public Advocates would be more effective
than those taken by the parties themselves? Where is the
value added?
The unique nature of Public Advocates and their
relationship with the suits in which they are involved
provide a number of answers to such concerns. First, it is
crucial to note that the actions taken by Public Advocates
will not always be duplicative, as their duties will often
cause them to fill certain advocacy roles that are commonly
left vacant in the status quo. For instance, many of the
current system’s problems can be attributed to the fact that
the interests of absent class members are inadequately
represented. Similarly, the system lacks a party that can be
relied upon to advocate on behalf of the public’s interest in
having judicial resources spent in the most efficient way
possible. Introducing a litigant to represent these interests
would not only help to ensure that the court is presented
with the voices of all interested parties, but would also
create a means by which judges could be apprised of factual
information that settlement-eager plaintiffs’ attorneys and
defendants might otherwise neglect to raise.170 By ensuring
that these groups have a party who will look out for their
interests, the proposed reform would help fix many of the
problems discussed earlier.
Second, even if a Public Advocate and one of the
primary parties to a suit take the same action, it is likely
that the different systemic roles occupied by these actors
170. See Macey & Miller, supra note 61, at 47-48 (stating that representation
of absent class members’ interests “is almost entirely missing under current
practice” and opining that introduction of an advocate for these interests with
the power to bring additional attention to the trial court would help remedy
problems related to unfair settlements); Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial
Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in
Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2190 (2000)
(describing how “public employees, paid without regard to the outcomes of
settlements, could provide ‘independent’ evaluations and represent groups
within aggregates” and resolve the problems associated with class counsel
failing to represent certain plaintiffs’ interests).

2012]

CLASS ACTIONS

803

will result in the court according different meanings to their
actions. When a defendant in a mass tort class action suit
files a motion opposing class certification, their action, in
and of itself, does not signify anything particularly
noteworthy. This can be attributed to the fact that
defendants in these types of suits will always oppose class
certification. When a Public Advocate involved in such a
suit files a motion opposing class certification, however, a
very different signal is sent to the court. Because Public
Advocates have a choice between abstaining from weighing
in and filing a motion that opposes or approves of class
certification, motions filed by Public Advocates would signal
to the courts that a sophisticated lawyer who owes no fealty
to either party thinks that strong reasons exist for the court
to decide an issue a certain way. Because only actions taken
by Public Advocates impart these types of messages, it
seems likely that courts would view their arguments in a
somewhat different light than similar arguments
articulated by one of the primary parties.
Additionally, Public Advocates would add value by
ensuring that all of the key factual and legal issues are
presented to the court. There are typically two reasons
informational gaps occur in class action suits. First, the
current system provides no safeguard against incompetent
advocacy leading to results that run contrary to the
interests of law and equity. This is not as large a concern in
standard litigation, where individual parties select their
representative and can retain alternative counsel at any
time. But it becomes more worrisome in class action
litigation, where class members cannot select who will serve
as class counsel and fail to properly monitor class counsel’s
behaviors.171 Mandating the inclusion of Public Advocates in
representative suits would provide some level of assurance
that suits with potentially massive public consequences are
not derailed from their proper adjudicatory course due to
inept counsel. Second, there are often instances where it
will be in both class counsel’s and defendant’s interests to
keep the court from being aware of certain information.172
171. Klement, supra note 102, at 31 (describing how the economic dynamics
present in most class action suits cause class members to under-monitor class
counsel’s conduct).
172. See id. at 46-47 (discussing the reasons why collusion between parties is a
significant risk in class action suits and why courts cannot rely upon class
counsel and defendants to supply the information they need in order to
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This most commonly arises when both of these groups want
a judge to approve the settlement they have proposed, but
fear that a full disclosure of certain information would cause
the judge to deny the settlement.173 In the status quo,
conspiring counsels’ attempts to keep information from the
court are likely to succeed, as judges lack the investigatory
resources to independently discover key facts.174 The
addition of Public Advocates to class action suits would
make it much more difficult for parties to hide relevant
information.
Finally, there is reason to believe that the mere act of
instituting the Public Advocate reform, divorced from any
actual actions taken by Public Advocates, would exert a
broad chilling effect on undesirable behavior. In order to
understand why this effect would exist, it is helpful to
consider the perspective of an unscrupulous class action
plaintiff’s lawyer. In the status quo, such an attorney feels
as though he is taking a relatively small risk when he
initiates a suit of dubious quality or files endless dilatory
motions.175 While he might end up having his suit dismissed
determine the fairness of a settlement); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Class
Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 808 (1997) (“Perhaps in no other
context do we find courts entering binding decrees with such a complete lack of
access to quality information and so completely dependent on the parties who
have the most to gain from favorable court action.”).
173. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
174. Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Bank, 77 F.R.D. 382, 383 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (“To
require the judge to occupy an adversary position . . . is highly inconsistent with
his acknowledged duty to act as an impartial arbitrator. The appointment of a
guardian for the class obviates this considerable problem of judicial
schizophrenia.”); see also Redish & Kastanek, supra note 85, at 574-75
(“American judges lack the investigatory resources available to judges in an
inquisitorial system.”).
175. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation
and Its Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 1489, 1508 (2006) (“[The PSLRA’s] sanction provision has been little
used as a weapon against possibly abusive class actions.”); Danielle Kie Hart,
And the Chill Goes On—Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs Beware: Rule 11 Vis-àvis 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Court’s Inherent Power, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 645,
662 (2004) (discussing survey results establishing that courts have imposed
significantly fewer sanctions since the 1993 Amendment to Rule 11); Howard A.
Cutler, Comment, A Practitioner’s Guide to the 1993 Amendment to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 265, 292 (1994) (discussing why the
modern version of Rule 11 is likely to undermine its ability to deter bad
behavior).
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or having his motion denied, it is unlikely that he will lose
anything other than his own labor if this occurs, and there
is always the chance that his actions will pay off in the form
of a settlement from a risk-adverse defendant. Introduction
of Public Advocates to class action suits, however, would
radically change this lawyer’s calculus. Because Public
Advocates will help courts filter out frivolous suits more
quickly, the likelihood that such a lawyer will ever benefit
from these types of actions will decrease substantially.
Further, any attorney who consistently files nonmeritorious class action lawsuits will build a bad reputation
within the relatively small community of Public Advocates.
This would lead Public Advocates to subject future suits
filed by such attorneys to increased scrutiny, further
reducing the chance that their suits will pay off and
increasing the risk that they could suffer judicial sanctions.
Hence, adoption of the proposal would create a strong
incentive for attorneys to abstain from filing frivolous suits
or motions.
CONCLUSION
If one were looking for low-hanging fruit in the world of
procedural reform, the status quo’s representative litigation
system would have to be considered an obvious choice. The
seemingly endless amount of negative attention that is
showered upon this area of the law by academics, legal
commentators, practitioners, and the media can only be
interpreted as a clear sign that class action procedure is an
area of the law that is ripe for reform. The diversity and
complexity of the problems that have been identified with
the current system make it impossible for minor reforms to
put this type of litigation back on track. A major reform, one
that affects a major change in the way that class action
suits operate, is warranted. The Public Advocate proposal
constitutes this type of reform and should be considered a
viable idea of how we could address modern procedure’s
flaws.

